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Abstract
Nowadays large-scale distributed applications rely on replication in order to improve
their services. Having data replicated in multiple datacenters increases availability, but
it might lead to concurrent updates that violate data integrity. A possible approach to
solve this issue is to use strong consistency in the application because this way there is
a total order of operations in every replica. However, that would make the application
abdicate of its availability. An alternative would be to use weak consistency to make the
application more available, but that could break data integrity. To resolve this issue many
of these applications use a combination of weak and strong consistency models, such that
synchronization is only introduced in the execution of operations that can break data
integrity.
To build applications that use multiple consistency models, developers have the dif-
ficult task of finding the right balance between two conflicting goals: minimizing syn-
chronization while preserving data integrity. To achieve this balance developers have to
reason about the concurrent effects of each operation, which is a non-trivial task when it
comes to large and complex applications.
In this document we propose an approach consisting of a static analysis tool that
helps developers find a balance between strong and weak consistency in applications
that operate over weakly consistent databases. The verification process is based on a
recently defined proof rule that was proven to be sound. The proposed tool uses Why3
as an intermediate framework that communicates with external provers, to analyse the
correctness of the application specification.
Our contributions also include a predicate transformer and a library of verified data
types that can be used to resolve commutativity issues in applications. The predicate
transformer can be used to lighten the specification effort.
Keywords: Replication, Data Integrity, Static Analysis, Consistency, Synchronization,
Why3
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Resumo
Atualmente aplicações de larga escala dependem de replicação de modo a poderem
melhorar os seus serviços. Ter dados replicados em múltiplos datacenters melhora a dis-
ponibilidade do sistema, mas ao mesmo tempo podem haver atualizações concorrentes
que violam a integridade dos dados. Uma possível abordagem para resolver esta situação
é utilizar consistência forte sobre a aplicação, porque deste modo existe sempre uma or-
dem total das operações em todas as réplicas. No entanto, isso faz com que a aplicação
abdique da sua disponibilidade. Uma alternativa é usar consistência fraca para tornar a
aplicação mais disponível, mas, isso pode quebrar a integridade dos dados. Para resolver
esta questão, diversas aplicações usam uma combinação de modelos de consistência fraca
e forte. Neste caso, sincronização apenas é introduzida no sistema quando são executadas
operações que podem colocar a integridade dos dados da aplicação em risco.
Para se construir aplicações que usam vários modelos de consistência, os developers
têm a difícil tarefa de encontrar o equilíbrio entre dois objetivos contraditórios: minimizar
sincronização enquanto se preserva a integridade dos dados. Para atingir este equilíbrio,
os developers têm de pensar nos efeitos concorrentes de cada operação, sendo uma tarefa
não-trivial quando se tratam de aplicações complexas e de larga escala.
Neste trabalho apresentamos uma abordagem que consiste numa ferramenta de aná-
lise estática para ajudar developers a encontrar o equilíbrio entre consistência fraca e forte
em aplicações que operam sobre bases de dados com consistência fraca. O processo de
verificação é baseado numa regra de prova que foi previamente provada correta. A fer-
ramenta proposta usa a plataforma Why3 para comunicar com provers externos para
analisar a correção da especificação duma aplicação.
As nossas contribuições também incluem um predicate transformer e uma biblioteca
de tipos de dados verificada, que podem ser usados para resolver problemas de comutati-
vidade. O predicate transformer pode ser usado para simplificar o esforço de especificação.
Palavras-chave: Replicação, Integridade dos dados, Análise estática, Consistência, Sin-
cronização, Why3
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1
Introduction
This chapter serves to contextualize and motivate the work from this thesis. Additionally
this chapter also presents our contributions and the structure of this document.
1.1 Context
Nowadays global-scale distributed applications, like social networks or online games,
rely on geo-replicated storage systems in order to improve user experience. These geo-
replicated storage systems consist of various replicas, scattered around the world, storing
copies of logic and data from the application. This enables operations to have low latency
since the requests are routed to the closest data centre, making the system more available
to the user. However, when updates occur simultaneously over different replicas, data
integrity can be compromised. A possible solution for this issue would be to introduce
synchronization in the system, by using a strong consistency model. On the other hand
the system can employ weak consistency. When a system uses weak consistency, if it
receives a request it does not wait for the synchronization between replicas. This way
the system becomes more available and its operations have low latency because after a
replica processes a request it sends an answer to the client immediately. However, there
is a possible loss of the correctness of the application due to undesirable concurrency
updates that can lead to the violation of data integrity invariants. On the other hand,
if strong consistency is used, the system behaves as a single centralised replica, thus
guaranteeing data integrity. However, due to this behaviour the availability of the system
will decrease [2, 37]. That being said, it is clear that each consistency model has its
benefits and downfalls. So, the goal is to build an application that has a high availability
combined with the guarantee of data integrity preservation.
1
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In order to build applications that enjoy the advantages of weak and strong consis-
tency, it was proposed that geo-replicated systems could use a combination of these
models [2, 3]. Specifically, the approach is to use strong consistency whenever the cor-
rectness of the application is at risk and leverage the benefits of weak consistency when
the concurrent execution is safe. However, finding a balance between weak and strong
consistency is a non-trivial task [27]. This happens because the programmer needs to rea-
son about the concurrent effects of every operation, and decide which operations require
synchronization in order to assure the correctness of the application [2, 28].
Recently some static analysis tools have been proposed that assist the programmers
in determining which operations of an application need synchronization in a distributed
setting. These tools receive a specification of an application and then determine the
adequate consistency model, such that its availability is maximized and data integrity is
guaranteed.
1.2 Motivation
As mentioned before, large-scale applications rely on geo-replication to improve their
availability and user experience. However, with replication comes the issue of concurrent
operations breaking data integrity. As a motivation let us consider an example of a
simple bank application where a client can only withdraw and deposit money from an
account, and where each account must always have a non-negative balance. Let us also
consider we have two replicas where the balance of an account is 100€. If there are two
concurrent withdraw operations that are trying to remove 100€ from that account then
both operations are allowed because they are not trying to remove more money than the
existent amount in the account. So when the effects of the operations are propagated, we
reach a state where in both replicas the balance of that account is -100€. This breaks the
property that every account must always have a non-negative balance. To illustrate this
example we present Figure 1.1.
Applications like Amazon’s Dynamo [15] use weaker consistency semantics, thus pro-
viding high availability but at the possible cost of losing data integrity. Other applications
like Yahoo’s PNUTS [12] avoid data inconsistencies by requiring all operations that up-
date the system to be funnelled through a primary site, but this approach makes them less
available. So, we can observe that both concepts have their advantages and disadvantages.
However, recent approaches [2, 37, 50] have showed that it is possible to achieve both
data integrity and high availability by using a combination of strong and weak consis-
tency models, with the objective of leveraging the advantages of both. However, finding
the balance between these models is not trivial. If strong consistency is used in too many
places then the availability of the system will decrease but if used in too few places then
data integrity can be at fault. So, the main goal in these approaches is to find the places
in the system where data integrity is at risk and use strong consistency. In the remaining
2
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withdraw(100):
✔
r1 r2
query: -100query: -100
σinit = 100(c)
withdraw(100):
✔
Figure 1.1: Concurrent execution of the withdraw operation.
components of the system the programmer employs weak consistency because the data
integrity is not at risk.
1.3 Contributions
The work of this thesis focuses on building a static analysis tool that can automatically
examine applications operating over weakly-consistent replicated databases. The goal of
our approach is to analyse an application and understand where to use synchronization,
in order to build an application that maximizes availability while guaranteeing data
integrity.
In our approach we propose that the programmer provides a sequential specification
of the application, for our tool to analyse. In the provided input the programmer needs
to specify the state of the application and its integrity invariants as well as the operations
of the application. Our approach is based on the proof obligations from the proof rule
proposed by CISE [28]. The result from these proof obligations are the places in the
system where conflicts can occur, and lead to the possible loss of data integrity. This way
the programmer knows where to introduce synchronization in the system.
In order to make the verification process more robust, we implemented our tool over
the deductive verification framework Why3 [19]. By implementing our tool over this
framework, the programmer does not have to worry about said process, only needing
to worry about writing the specification. And to aid the programmer with writing the
specification we present a strongest postcondition predicate transformer. This predicate
transformer automatically generates strongest postconditions, thus making the specifica-
tion process less cumbersome for the programmer.
3
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Another contribution is a library of Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs) [47]
verified and implemented using the Why3 framework. CRDTs are data types that guaran-
tee data convergence in a self-established way, by means of a deterministic conflict resolu-
tion policy. This library of CRDTs can be used by the programmer to erase commutativity
issues in applications, in a way that reduces the amount of introduced synchronisation.
Finally we present as a contribution a set of case studies that were implemented and
verified using our tool. This set of case studies helped us validate our approach.
The work developed in the context of this thesis also produced two articles. The first
one "CISE3: Verificação de aplicações com consistência fraca em Why3" presented in
INForum 2019 in Guimarães.
1.4 Document Structure
The remaining of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we provide some
preliminary concepts related to the work of this thesis. In Chapter 3 we describe the main
concepts of our prototype. In Chapter 4 we show three complete case studies used to
validate our approach. In Chapter 5 we present some static analysis tools that are related
to ours, also showing some comparisons between them. Finally in Chapter 6 we discuss
and summarize our approach, also presenting some future work.
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Background
This chapter focuses on presenting the key concepts involved in this thesis. The main
concepts resolve around analysis of programs, the Why3 framework, consistency models,
CRDTs, Hoare’s logic, design by contract and predicate transformers.
2.1 Analysis of Programs
An important aspect regarding software construction is guaranteeing its correctness. By
correctness we mean that the program satisfies its safety and liveness properties. In order
to know what is the expected behaviour of a program there should be a specification
defined by the developers. Specifications are used because they are simple, making it
easier to analyse. However, specifications are usually incomplete and do not show the
full set of correct states a program can have, but all the states it covers must be correct.
To analyse a program’s behaviour, there are three kinds of analyses that can be per-
formed: dynamic analysis, static analysis or a combination of both. Dynamic analysis
techniques consist in verifying a program during its execution. Approaches to this tech-
nique can be some form of testing like unit/coverage testing, or runtime monitors to
constantly check that the program does not violate correctness. Theses violations how-
ever, are only visible after an unexpected behaviour occurs. Another kind of dynamic
analysis is runtime verification, which consists in checking formal properties during run-
time [48]. Analysing a program with dynamic analysis has some disadvantages, like the
introduction of an overhead to the system and the fact that it might not detect all the
errors. Additionally, it does not guarantee the absence of errors because, the program
may pass one test suite but there might be another test that could break the program.
As an alternative to dynamic analysis, we have static verification. Static verification de-
scribes the verification process done at compile time, by verifying the source code of the
5
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program instead of executing it. This technique can ensure the absence of errors of a
well defined kind, for example no null dereferences. It can also verify some correctness
properties like functionality and security. Another advantage of static analysis is that it
does not introduce any runtime overhead. However, this approach has some limitations
like the amount of time it consumes and the possibility of detecting false positives. A
false positive occurs when an error is said to exist when it does not. These false positives
occur because the static analysis verifies a program given a set of rules provided by the
programmer, so if they are not well defined then false positives can be detected.
The purpose of these two techniques, is to build high quality software, and can be
combined to get the best of both approaches. Normally when combining these techniques
the process starts with static analysis, proceeded by a dynamic analysis process done
having in mind the information obtained with the static analysis. The dynamic analysis is
more effective because with the information obtained by the static analysis it is possible
to restrict the sources of potential anomalies, thus having a decrease in the overhead
introduced in the system. By restricting the possible sources of errors with static analysis
the dynamic analysis will not be so broad and the test suites can be more precise [18].
Also, it is widely acknowledged that statically verifying every invariant is a difficult and
time consuming task. Dynamic analysis can improve on such situation, since it delegates
invariant checking for runtime execution. One example of a tool that combines both these
analysis techniques is Spark2014 [29].
2.2 Why3 Framework
Why3 is a framework that uses deductive program verification which is the "process of
turning the correctness of a program into a mathematical statement and then proving
it"[19]. Why3’s architecture is divided in two parts: a purely logical back-end and a
programs front-end [19]. The front-end part receives files that contain a list of modules,
from which verification conditions will be extracted, and subsequently sent to external
theorem demonstrators.
This tool provides a programming language called WhyML, which has two purposes:
writing programs and the formal specifications of their behaviours. Programs written
in WhyML have at their disposal a first order language with some features commonly
found in functional languages, like pattern-matching, algebraic types and polymorphism.
Also it offers some imperative features like records with mutable fields and exceptions.
The logic used to write formal specifications is an extension of the first-order logic with
polymorphic types, algebraic types, inductive predicates, and recursive definitions, as
well as a limited form of higher-order logic [22]. Another useful feature that WhyML
provides is ghost code that has the main purpose of facilitating specifications. This type
of code is similar to normal code in the sense that it is parsed, type checked and turned
into verification conditions in the same way [19]. A particularity of ghost code is that it
can be removed from a program without changing its final result. This happens because
6
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Why3
automated theorem provers
CVC4, Alt-Ergo, Z3, Yices,
E, SPASS, Vampire, Gappa, etc.
proof assistants
Coq, PVS, Isabelle
Java code
Krakatoa
C code
Frama-C
Ada code
Spark2014EasyCrypt
CAOVerif Atelier B
1
Figure 2.1: Why3 as an intermediate language.
ghost code cannot be used in a regular code computation, and it cannot modify a regular
code mutable value [23]. Also this type of code cannot modify non-ghost data, just access
it, but regular code cannot modify or access ghost data, only ghost code can modify ghost
data. This language can also be used as an intermediate language for the verification of
programs written in C, Ada or Java in a similar fashion to the Boogie language [21]. The
programs are written in some language, then they are translated into a WhyML program
and finally the verification conditions are extracted and sent to the provers. Frama-C [34],
Spark2014 [29] and Krakatoa [20] are frameworks that use WhyML as an intermediate
language for the verification of programs written in C, Ada and Java respectively as it is
shown in Figure 2.1.
The framework focuses on the concept of task, a list of declarations followed by a goal.
These tasks can be extracted from the files given to the front end component or can be
obtained from a file given directly to the back end of the framework. These tasks then
suffer some transformations in order for the specified theorem prover to comprehend
them and for the tasks to fit the prover’s logic. For example if we want to use Z3, then an
issue arises since its logic is different from Why3’s logic, hence the need for the transfor-
mations to be applied [8]. In order to ease the procedure of applying the transformations,
there is a text file called driver that is associated to every prover supported by Why3 [8].
This driver file contains the transformations to be applied, the output format, the list of
built-in symbols and corresponding axioms to ignore [19].
This framework has already been used to prove several realistic programs including
VOCAL an OCaml library [9, 42], a certified first-order theorem prover [10], an interpreter
for the language CoLiS [32], Strassen’s algorithm for matrix multiplication [11] and an
efficient arbitrary-precision Integer library [44].
7
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
2.3 Consistency Models
2.3.1 Operation Consistency Models
Global distributed data stores with high availability and scalable information require
geo-replication in order to be more available in different parts of the globe. The CAP
theorem [27] shows that in order to maximize availability and tolerate network failures,
these systems must compromise their requirements for the consistency of its data. This
theorem says that in a distributed system it is impossible to simultaneously have these
three guarantees:
• Strong consistency: Every client of the data store observes the effects of the most
recent write operation.
• Availability: All operations finish eventually.
• Partition-tolerance: The system is not vulnerable to network partitions. Network
partitions are anomalies that fraction the system into multiple components. In the
case of a network partitioning, if a replica from a component sends a message to
another replica outside that same component, then that message will be lost.
The impossibility of having these three properties in a distributed system is proved by
contradiction. Assuming there is a network consisting of at least two nodes, it is possible
to divide it into two non-empty disjoint sets S1,S2. It is assumed that all the messages
between partition S1 and partition S2 are lost. If a write operation occurs in a node in
partition S1 and then a read operation occurs in partition S2, then it will not be able to
witness the effects of the write operation.
In the properties shown above, there is one called strong consistency. However, consis-
tency is a spectrum where in one end there is strong consistency and at the other end there
is eventual consistency. Strong consistency is the strictest model and eventual consistency
is the less strict model when it comes to consistency guarantees. In strong consistency, the
system behaves as if only one replica existed, ensuring a total order of operations in every
replica. The data is passed to the replicas as soon as a write operation is issued to a replica.
However, during the time the replicas are being updated, the system does not process
another write operation until all the replicas are consistent. This model guarantees con-
sistency of the data but on the other hand, the system suffers a decrease in its availability
and an increase of the latency of its operations. On the other end of the spectrum there
is eventual consistency. Under this model when a replica receives a write operation it
executes it and then answers the client. After that, asynchronously, that replica sends the
effects of the write operation to the remaining replicas. This means that it is possible for
a new write operation to be processed without consensus with other replicas, hence the
possible violation of data integrity. The positives of this model are the high availability
of the system and the low latency of the operations. Since eventual consistency is less
8
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strict then strong consistency, then this model belongs to a range of consistency models
called weak consistency. Another well known example of a weak consistency model is
causal consistency. The causal consistency model is based on Lamport’s definition of the
happens-before relation [35] which captures the notion of causality by relating an oper-
ation to previous operations on the same replica and to other operations performed on
other replicas whose effects are propagated using messages. Normally causal consistency
is seen as a combination of the following four properties:
• Read your writes: A client must always be able to observe the effects of all previous
writes issued by itself.
• Monotonic Reads: Subsequent reads issued by the same client should observe either
the same state or the same state that has been modified by write operations.
• Monotonic Writes: The effects of multiple write operations issued by some client
must be observed in the same order that they occurred by the remaining clients.
• Writes follow reads: This guarantees that write operations come after read opera-
tions that have influenced them.
However, causal consistency by itself does not guarantee that the state of the system
converges because divergence can last forever without breaking any of its properties. Hav-
ing this in mind a consistency model has been proposed where geo-replicated systems
could use a combination of several consistency models, which is used by many systems
nowadays [2, 37, 50]. Specifically, the approach would be to use strong consistency when-
ever the correction of the application is at risk, and leverage weak consistency when the
operations are safe. This way it is possible to take advantage of an asynchronous execu-
tion when operations are safe [38], thus increasing availability and at the same time when
critical operations are executed, there is a guarantee of correctness of the application.
The main challenge regarding this consistency model is achieving the correct balance
between weak and strong consistency because the programmer needs to think about the
concurrent effects of the operations, and decide which operations require synchronisation
to assure the correction of the application. This is one of the main concerns approached
by this work.
2.3.2 Transaction Consistency Models
A transaction is an operation that groups multiple read and write operations into a single
coarse-grained operation that preserves the ACID properties:
• Atomicity (All-or-Nothing): All the operations have their intended effects or none
of them have, and this is essential because it prevents updates to the data store from
occurring only partially.
9
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
• Correctness: The state of the data store respects all the invariants before and after
the execution of a transaction.
• Isolation: Each transaction executes with no interference from other concurrent
transactions, which means that either all the effects from a transaction are visible
or none of them is.
• Durability: The effects of a transaction that terminates successfully are not lost
independently of failures that might occur.
Together these properties provide the serializability model, a program semantics in
which a transaction executes as if it was the only one accessing the database. This model
allows concurrent operations to access the data store and achieve expected results because
it restricts the acceptable interactions between concurrent transactions [46].
There are several consistency models that can be used for transactions but the focus
in this section goes to the following:
• Read Committed (RC): Transactions that use this level of isolation only witness ef-
fects of write operations from transactions that committed, thus ensuring atomicity
of the transactions. This consistency model does not offer any other guarantees [6].
• Monotonic Atomic View (MAV): This consistency model strengthens the Read
Committed model by preventing lost updates. MAV also ensures that when an
operation from transaction T1 witnesses the effects of a transaction T2, then the
subsequent operations from T1 will also witness the effects of T2. This model is
helpful when it comes to enforcing the integrity of foreign key constraints, mate-
rialized views, indices and secondary updates. For this model to be used, the data
store only needs to keep track of the set of transactions that have been witnessed
by the running transaction, and before the execution of an operation it needs to be
ensured that the replica includes all the transactions in the set [1].
• Repeatable Read (RR): The semantics of this consistency model requires that the
transaction witnesses a snapshot of the state of the data store, and this snapshot can
be obtained from any replica of the system [6].
2.4 CRDTs
As it was mentioned in Section 2.3 with replication comes the issue of the consistency
of the stored data. Eventual consistency is an example of a model that can provide high
availability but at the same time introduces a lack of consistency guarantees, because it
does not guarantee that replicas will converge. Shapiro et. al [47] proposed a theoretically-
sound approach to eventual consistency called strong eventual consistency. This system
model proposes conditions to achieve convergence and avoid the complexity of ad-hoc
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conflict resolution and roll-back [47]. The data types that satisfy the previous condi-
tions are called Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs). These data types guarantee
convergence in a self-established way, despite failures. Also, these data types have a
deterministic conflict resolution policy by construction. CRDTs do not require synchro-
nization for an update to happen, and they remain responsive, available and scalable
despite high latency, faults or disconnection from the network [47]. CRDTs are mutable
objects that are replicated in a set of replicas that are interconnected by an asynchronous
network, which can partition and recover. In this network, processes that do not crash
are considered as correct, and in the case of a crash of a process, when it recovers it comes
back with its memory intact.
A client of a CRDT object has two types of operations he can call in order to commu-
nicate with it: read and update. Read operations are called to read the current state of
the object and the update operations serve to update the state of the object. Either one of
these methods are only applied in one replica and then the effects are propagated to the
remaining replicas asynchronously.
CRDTs can be divided into two categories: operation-based CRDTs and state-based
CRDTs. With state-based CRDTs, also known as Convergent Replicated Data Types
(CvRDT), every replica often sends its state to another replica in order to propagate
the updates that occurred to its state. The replica that receives the state from a remote
replica then merges it with its own state. This merge operation needs to be idempotent,
commutative and associative. The new state then has all the updates that occurred in
the replica that sent the state and the updates that occurred in the replica that received
the state and merged it. This kind of CRDTs only requires eventual consistency for all
the replicas to know the effects of an operation. Since this kind of CRDTs only requires
eventual consistency, there is the issue of inconsistency of the data since the replicas
only eventually receive the effects of a write operation executed in another replica. The
advantages of state based CRDTs are the high availability of the system and the low
latency of operations. The other kind of CRDTs are the Operation-based CRDTs, also
know as Commutative Replicated Data Type (CmRDT). Contrarily to the state-based
CRDTs, operation-based CRDTs do not provide the merge operation. With this kind
of CRDTs, the update operation is split in two: a prepare-update method and an effect-
update method. The prepare-update is executed at the replica where the operation was
invoked, and the effect-update is executed afterwards. The effect-update is executed at all
the remaining replicas that received this operation from the replica where the prepare-
update was executed. An update is only considered as being delivered at a replica when it
is included in its causal history [47]. Since this type of CRDTs requires causal consistency
for updates, then there is also the issue of not guaranteeing the consistency of the data.
There are several data structures that can be chosen from for the implementation
of a CRDT like a flag or a set for example. A set is an abstract data type that can only
store unique values without any specific order. Considering a set that has operations
add and remove, there is the possibility of originating sequences of operations that do
11
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1 type remove_wins_set ’a = {
2 mutable remove_wins_add: fset ’a;
3 mutable remove_wins_removes: fset ’a;
4 }
5
6 let ghost predicate equal (s1 s2: remove_wins_set ’a) =
7 s1.remove_wins_add == s2.remove_wins_add &&
8 s1.remove_wins_removes == s2.remove_wins_removes
9
10 val empty_set () : remove_wins_set ’a
11 ensures { is_empty result.remove_wins_add }
12 ensures { is_empty result.remove_wins_removes }
13
14 predicate in_set (elt: ’a) (s: remove_wins_set ’a) =
15 mem elt s.remove_wins_add && not (mem elt s.remove_wins_removes)
16
17 val add_element (elt: ’a) (s: remove_wins_set ’a) : unit
18 writes { s.remove_wins_add }
19 ensures { s.remove_wins_add = add elt (old s).remove_wins_add }
20
21 val remove_element (elt: ’a) (s: remove_wins_set ’a) : unit
22 writes { s.remove_wins_removes }
23 ensures { s.remove_wins_removes = add elt (old s).remove_wins_removes }
24
Figure 2.2: Remove-wins Set CRDT in Why3.
not commute when executed concurrently. For example, if there is a remove operation
and an add operation executed concurrently regarding the same object, more specifically
if the add(o) operation occurs after the remove(o) then the object o remains in the Set,
but if the operations are executed in the reverse order then object o would not be in the
set. One way of solving this issue is making sure that a remove(o) only affects add(o)
operations that are visible to remove(o). To achieve this, every element o from the set has
an associated unique tag t and then when an operation remove(o) occurs, all the tags from
o that the local replica knows are removed [47]. This way the set becomes an add-wins
set because the precedence is given to an add operation when executed concurrently with
a remove operation. If the precedence is given to the remove operation, then it becomes a
remove-wins set. An example of remove-wins set is presented in Figure 2.2.
2.5 Hoare’s Logic
The concept of Hoare’s logic was introduced by Hoare [30] and had the goal of providing
a logical basis in order to prove the properties of a computer program using deductive
reasoning. Deductive reasoning is the process of relating premises with conclusions such
that if all premises are true, the terms are not ambiguous, and the rules of deductive logic
are followed, then the conclusion is true.
One of the most important aspects in analysing a computer program, is checking
12
2.6. DESIGN BY CONTRACT
if given its properties and the consequences of its execution, the program reaches a
state that respects the expected behaviour of said program. The expected behaviour
of a program can be specified as a set of assertions regarding properties of a program
that need to be preserved before and after its execution. These assertions are expressed
using mathematical symbols and logic. Hoare starts by dividing the assertions in two
categories: preconditions and postconditions. The preconditions specify the properties a
program must respect prior to its execution. If the properties specified are not preserved
prior to the execution of the program, then it is impossible to prove anything about its
execution. The postconditions express the properties that the program needs to respect
after its execution. With these two kinds of assertions, a notation is proposed in order
to illustrate the connection between them and the program. In this notation, we have
the program (Q), the preconditions (P) and the postconditions (R) resulting in {P} Q {R},
which can be translated to "If the assertions in P are true before the execution of Q,
then the assertions in R will be true after its completion" [30]. In the case where no
preconditions are provided, then the notation writes {true} Q {R}, because there are no
restrictions on the properties to be preserved by the program prior to its execution.
The axioms and rules of inference that were presented together with this notation in
Hoare’s paper, do not give a basis to guarantee that a program successfully terminates [30].
A possible cause of non-termination of a program is an infinite loop for example. Since
this logic does not guarantee the successful termination of a program, it only guarantees
partial correctness. Thus, the notation {P} Q {R} should be interpreted as "provided that
the program successfully terminates, the properties of its results are described in R" [30].
2.6 Design by Contract
Following the efforts of Dijkstra [17], Floyd [51], and Hoare [30] Meyer also addressed
the use of assertions in an object-oriented language [7]. Meyer specified some guidelines
regarding object-oriented construction in order to improve its reliability using assertions.
The term reliability is often associated with a programming technique called defensive
programming, which consists of including as many checks as possible, even if they are
redundant, to protect every module of a program from possible anomalies. The problem
of adding redundant checks to a software module is that it goes against the principle
of improving its quality, since it causes an increase of its runtime complexity. This hap-
pens because when more checks are added more software is added, which implies more
locations where things can go wrong so they also need to be verified, thus creating an
"infinite loop" where we are adding new software and checks for the software that was
just introduced.
Since defensive programming is not a very systematic approach to guaranteeing re-
liability, another solution is proposed more specifically, contract theory. This method
presents the notion of a contract for software development, which has an inspiration
from contracts that exist between people, where every party involved has obligations and
13
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benefits. In a contract, a benefit for one of the involved parties is usually an obligation for
another involved party. Specifying a contract in software can be achieved using assertions
which define the relation between the caller of the routine and the called routine. The
types of assertions that are used are the following:
• Preconditions: These assertions specify the requirements for a call of a routine,
more specifically the obligations for the callers of the routine. If there are no pre-
conditions on a routine then any state of computation is accepted before the exe-
cution of the routine. When there is a violation of a precondition then there is an
indication that a bug exists in the caller’s code or there is an error in its specification,
because it failed with its obligations.
• Postconditions: These assertions specify the properties that are ensured after the
execution of a routine, more specifically the obligations of the routine. If there are
no postconditions any state of computation is accepted after the execution of the
routine. When there is a violation of a postcondition then there is an indication of
a bug in the routine’s code since it failed with its obligations.
• Class Invariants: The invariant must be satisfied after the creation of every instance
of a class and it must also be preserved by every routine that is available for the
clients to call.
As previously mentioned, in defensive programming the focus is on using as many
checks as possible even if they are redundant. Using preconditions, on the other hand,
helps reducing the redundancy in tests. The stronger the precondition the bigger the
burden is to the client calling the routine making this routine more demanding, but the
stronger the postcondition is, the bigger the burden on the routine making the routine
more tolerant.
2.7 Predicate Transformers
The concept of a predicate transformer was introduced by Dijkstra [16]. A predicate
transformer consists of a mapping from one predicate to another predicate of a program-
ming language. Regarding predicate transformers, there are two kinds: the weakest
precondition and the strongest postcondition.
The terms "weakest" and "strongest" can be explained with a simple example: if A
implies B but B does not imply A, then B is "weaker" than A and A is "stronger" than B.
To better understand the previous explanation, here it is an example:
{x > 0} x := x+ 1 {x > 0}
{x > −1} x := x+ 1 {x > 0}
Above we have a function that increments the value of x which has two different
and valid preconditions according to Hoare’s logic. On the first example we have the
precondition {x > 0} and in the second example we have {x > −1}. The precondition
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{x > −1} is weaker than {x > 0}, because the latter implies the first. For this function and
its precondition, {x > −1} is the weakest precondition.
The weakest precondition predicate transformer (wp) tries to find the weakest precon-
dition for a function S such that S must terminate and an allowed final state is reached.
On the other hand, the strongest postcondition predicate transformer (sp) states that if a
function S starts at a state that respects its preconditions, then if S terminates a state will
be reached that respects the strongest postcondition [26]. The weakest precondition cal-
culus guarantees the termination of the function S, whereas the strongest postcondition
calculus does not.
Predicate transformers can be used for the automatic inference of preconditions, post-
conditions or loop invariants, thus helping reduce the overhead on the part of the pro-
grammer when it comes to writing them [25]. Automated program verifiers normally
have a verification condition generator (VC gen) as a sub-component. These verification
condition generators are considered as predicate transformers in the sense that they apply
transformations to the VC’s before they are presented to an automated theorem prover.
In the following subsections, we will explain the semantics involving both kinds of
predicate transformers.
2.7.1 Weakest Precondition Calculus
For this kind of predicate transformer there are two variants: the weakest conservative
precondition calculus and the weakest liberal precondition calculus. The first type is
used to find the unique P, which is the weakest precondition for S and Q in the following
Hoare’s triple {P} S {Q} such that S terminates and produces a final state that respects Q.
The second type is used to find the unique P, which is the weakest precondition for S and
Q in the following Hoare’s triple {P} S {Q} such that either S terminates and S produces
a final state that respects Q or the execution of S does not terminate. For this section we
will focus on the weakest conservative precondition calculus.
The weakest precondition calculus is related to Hoare’s logic as we stated before, but
there are other comparisons that can be made. Hoare’s logic is relational1 because for
each Q there are many P such that {P} S {Q}, whereas WP is functional because for each Q
there is only one assertion WP(S,Q). WP respects Hoare’s logic because {WP (S,Q)} S {Q} is
true. Additionally, as it was mentioned Hoare’s logic only guarantees partial correctness,
but WP guarantees its termination, thus guaranteeing total correctness.
In order to explain the weakest precondition calculus rules, we will consider a sim-
ple language, which is the representative of the actual intermediate language used in
ESC/Java [45], whose BNF is presented in Figure 2.3.
Every execution of a statement from the language shown in Figure 2.3, either blocks,
goes wrong (e.g. failure to terminate caused by an infinite loop) or terminates [36]. The
1Not to be confused with Relational Hoare’s logic [5]
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S,T ::= Id := Expr
| assert Expr
| assume Expr
| S ; T
| S or T
Figure 2.3: BNF of the ESC/Java language.
Stmt wp (Stmt,Q)
x := E Q [x := E]
assert E E ∧ Q
assume E E⇒ Q
S ; T wp(S, wp(T , Q))
S or T wp(S,Q) ∧ wp(T,Q)
Table 2.1: Weakest Precondition Calculus Rules.
first statement is the assignment which sets the variable Id to the value of Expr. The fol-
lowing statements are the assert statement and the assume statement, which only execute
if expression Expr attached evaluates to true. If the expression of the assert statement
evaluates to false then the execution goes wrong and if the expression of the assume
statement evaluates to false the execution blocks. The statement S ; T is the sequential
composition of S and T, where T only executes if S terminates. The last statement is S or T ,
which corresponds to the arbitrary choice between S and T.
In order to execute the weakest precondition calculus we evaluate the provided func-
tion S and postconditions Q. Depending on which statement is found on the code, a
specific transformation is applied in order to achieve the weakest precondition. For each
possible statement of the language being analysed, we apply the associated transforma-
tion, that can be seen in Table 2.1 [17]. The assignment statement rule, Q [x := E] has
the same meaning of let x = E in Q end. The remaining rules presented in Table 2.1 are
self-explanatory.
2.7.2 Strongest Postcondition Calculus
The strongest postcondition predicate transformer (SP) is a function that receives as
input a precondition P and a function S and returns the unique Q, which is the strongest
postcondition of S with regard to its precondition P such that {P} S {SP (S,P)} must be
satisfied. SP does not guarantee the termination of function S received as an input,
thus only guaranteeing partial correctness like Hoare’s logic. Similar to the weakest
precondition predicate transformer, SP is also functional in the sense that for a given
function S and its preconditions P, there is only one Q that is the strongest postcondition
of S.
As it was done in the previous section, we consider the intermediate language used
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Stmt sp (Stmt,P)
x := E ∃x′. x = E(x← x′) ∧ P (x← x′)
assert E E ∧ P
assume E E ∧ P
S ; T sp(T, sp(S,P))
S or T sp(S,P) ∨ sp(T,P)
Table 2.2: Strongest Precondition Calculus Rules.
in ESC/Java in order to present the semantics of the strongest postcondition calculus.
The semantic rules for the strongest postcondition calculus are presented in Table 2.2.
The assignment statement rule, states that a there is variable x′ such that the logical
conjunction of the assignment of E to x with Q is true, by replacing in the expression
E and Q every occurrence of x with x′. The remaining rules presented in Table 2.2 are
self-explanatory.
2.8 CISE proof rule
CISE [28] presents a proof rule and tool for proving the preservation of integrity in-
variants in applications built over replicated databases. For this proof rule a generic
consistency model is proposed, and it allows the definition of specific consistency models
for each operation of the application. This consistency model assumes causal consistency
which means that the communication between replicas guarantees causality. This means
that if a replica sends a message containing the effect of an operation o2 after it sends or
receives a message containing the effect of an operation o1, then no replica will receive the
message about o2 before it receives the one about o1. The causal propagation of messages
can solve some issues. However, just the use of causal consistency does not ensure the
preservation of some integrity invariants [28]. One problem that can occur is when two
operations update the database, without being aware of the effects of each other.
CISE’s proposed consistency model allows the strengthening of causal consistency, by
letting the programmer specify which operations cannot be executed concurrently. This is
done using a token system T, containing a non-empty set of tokens Tokens and a conflict
relation ./ over tokens. The set Tokens presents the tokens that can be associated with the
application’s operations and the conflict relation ./ states which tokens are conflicting.
If two operations with conflicting tokens try to execute concurrently, then they need to
be executed in a way that both operations know the effects of one another, making them
causally dependent. Since operations with conflicting tokens are causally dependent,
causal message propagation ensures that every replica will execute those operations in
the same order. CISE’s proof rule is modular, in the sense that it allows for the tool to
reason about the behavior of each operation individually [28]. Also, the proof-rule is
state-based because it reasons in terms of states obtained by evaluating the effects that
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operations have on the state of the application.
Following the proof rule presented by CISE, the CISE tool was developed with the
purpose of automating said proof rule. This tool is SMT-based, meaning it uses off-the-
shelf SMT solvers to discharge generated verification conditions. The CISE tool has had
two iterations [38, 41]. The first version of the tool was developed by Najafzadeh et
al. [41], and used Z3’s low-level APIs directly [40], making it difficult to use. The second
version of the tool was developed by Marcelino et. al. [38], in which the specifications
were written in Boogie [4]. Boogie generates a set of verification conditions from the
programmer’s specification, and then discharges them to an SMT solver. One advantage
this tool has over the Z3 version is the fact that the specifications are written in a higher-
level specification language. That means the programmer does not have to deal with Z3’s
low-level API. However, there is a downfall of using Boogie, which is its current lack of
active maintenance. Both tools provide a counterexample when the verification process
fails.
CISE’s proof rule proposes three proof obligations: the safety analysis, the commuta-
tivity analysis, and the stability analysis. These three proof obligations can be resumed
as follows:
• Safety Analysis: Verifies if the effects of an operation, when executed without any
concurrency, preserve the invariants of the application.
• Commutativity Analysis: Verifies if every pair of different operations commute,
i.e., if the operations are executed in any order, then the same final state is reached
starting from the same initial state.
• Stability Analysis: Verifies if the pre-conditions of an operation are stable under
the effects of each operation of the system. If two operations are stable, they can be
safely executed concurrently.
If there is a pair of operations where one of them can violate the other’s precondition
when executed concurrently, then a set of tokens is associated to these operations. The
idea is to associate pairs of tokens with the specified conflict relation, thus stating that
these operations cannot be executed concurrently. In the Z3 version of the tool the to-
kens are only associated to the operations, ignoring their parameters, only allowing for
a coarse-grained approach [41]. For the Boogie version of the tool the token association
mechanism became more fine-grained, testing different values for the parameters of each
pair of conflicting operations. This was done to find the cases where the combination of
parameters could break the invariants. The programmer associates tokens to arguments
of the operations and states, via a conflict relation, which arguments have conflicting to-
kens. When operations that have arguments with conflicting tokens execute concurrently,
then if the arguments have the same value they need to be synchronised in order to be
safely executed [38].
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CISE3 Architecture
In this section we discuss how our tool CISE3 works. In Section 3.1 we present an overview
of our tool. In Section 3.2 we present how our tool performs the three proof obligations
from the CISE proof rule, presented in Section 2.8. In Section 3.3 we discuss the specifi-
cation of token systems, using our provided DSL. In Section 3.4 we present our CRDTs
library for the resolution of commutativity issues. In Section 3.5 we present the imple-
mentation of the strongest postcondition calculus from our tool.
3.1 CISE3 Overview
In this thesis we are proposing a static analysis tool, to automatically analyse applications
operating over weakly consistent databases with the aid of the deductive verification
framework Why3 [21]. This approach follows the proof rule proposed by CISE [28]. Since
our approach is based on CISE’s proof rule we assume causal consistency as mentioned in
Section 2.8. This assumption can be relaxed to eventual consistency, as we discuss later
in Section 6.2.
As we mention in Section 2.2, the Why3 framework provides a programming and
high level specification language. From programs written and annotated using WhyML,
are generated verification conditions, that can be sent to several of the more than 25
supported theorem provers. This diversity allows to rectify some limitations from other
proof tools that just support one theorem prover, usually an SMT solver. Simultaneously,
the Why3 framework also provides a graphic environment for the development of pro-
grams, where we can interact with several theorem provers, perform small interactive
proof steps [14], as well as, visualising counter-examples.
The Why3 framework can be extended via plug-ins like in the cases of Jessie [39] and
Krakatoa [20]. The integration of new plug-ins into Why3 is relatively simple: we write
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a parser for our target language, whose intermediate representation should me mapped
to an non-typed AST of the WhyML language. Finally, we use the typing mechanism
from Why3 to generate a typed version of the previous AST. The WhyML program that
is generated after this typing phase, can now be analysed by the Why3 framework. The
CISE3 tool is a plug-in for the Why3 framework whose target language is WhyML which
is why we also leveraged the already existing parser for the WhyML language.
The CISE3 architecture presented in Figure 3.1 has four components:
• Proof Obligations Component: This component is related with the execution of
the three proof obligations from CISE’s proof rule. After the execution of this
component the programmer knows the pairs of non-commutative and conflicting
operations.
• Token System Component: This component is related with the specification and
validation of a token system defined by the programmer. For this component we
provide a DSL that programmers can use in order to specify token systems. When
the programmer provides a token system to our tool then the "Proof Obligations
Component" suffers some modifications as discussed in Section 3.3.
• CRDTs library Component: This component is related with the use of CRDTs for
solving commutativity issues found in applications. For this part of our tool, we
provide a library of CRDTs implemented and verified using the Why3 framework.
After the execution of the "Proof Obligations Component" the programmer is aware
of the pairs of non-commutative operations and can use a CRDT from this library
to solve this issue as seen in Figure 3.1.
• SP Component: This component is related with the automatic generation of strongest
postconditions for operations of the applications to be analysed by our tool. For
this component we provide a strongest postconditions predicate transformer over a
DSL of ours, similar to a subset of the WhyML language.
We believe that our choice of the Why3 framework, and basing our tool on its archi-
tecture of plug-ins, has allowed for a reduction of the development and validation effort
for CISE3. Also, developing our tool over a mature framework allows us to evolve for the
analysis of more realistic examples.
3.2 Proof Obligations Component
As we mention in Section 2.8, the safety analysis from the CISE proof rule consists of
verifying if an operation when executed without any concurrency does not break an
integrity invariant of the application. As an input, the programmer provides to the tool
the specification of the application’s state and its invariants, as well as the sequential
implementation and specification of each operation. As an example of a generic Why3
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Figure 3.1: CISE3 architecture.
1 type τ [@state] = { x : τx }
2 invariant { I }
3
4 let f (x : τ1) (state: τ)
5 requires { P1 }
6 ensures { Q1 }
7 = e1
8
9 let g (y : τ2) (state: τ)
10 requires { P2 }
11 ensures { Q2 }
12 = e2
13
Figure 3.2: Generic program in Why3.
program we consider the program presented in Figure 3.2. This program is composed
by operations f and g, and the type of the state of the application τ , with the invariant I
associated to it.
When the programmer is specifying the type of the state of the application, he needs
to associate to it the tag [@state], so it is possible to identify this type as the representa-
tive of the state, as it is seen in Figure 3.2. The type τ possesses a set of fields represented
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1 let ghost f_g_commutativity () : (τ, τ)
2 returns { (s1, s2) → eq s1 s2 }
3 = val x1 : τ1 in
4 val state1 : τ in
5 val x2 : τ2 in
6 val state2 : τ in
7 assume { P1 (x1,state1) ∧ P2 (x2,state2) ∧
8 eq state1 state2 }
9 f x1 state1;
10 g x2 state1;
11 g x2 state2;
12 f x1 state2;
13 (state1, state2)
14
Figure 3.3: Generated commutativity and stability analysis function for operations f
and g.
by x, whose types are represented as τx. Additionally, in the code shown in Figure 3.2
there is the definition of operations f and g. Every operation must have an instance of the
state of the application passed as an argument so it can be used later in the generation
of commutativity and stability analysis functions. In the code from Figure 3.2, the pre-
conditions of operation f are represented as P1, the postconditions are represented as Q1
and its body is represented as e1. The specification of the operation g is similar to the one
of f, but in this case the preconditions, postconditions and body are represented by P2,
Q2 and e2 respectively.
The Why3 framework by itself already has the ability of verifying for each operation,
if its implementation adheres to the specification. Also, the programmer by specifying the
state of the application with its integrity invariants, can use Why3 to verify if an operation
breaks them or not, given its implementation. In the cases where a verification condition
from the program is not discharged, the framework can present a counter-example [13].
That said, it is possible to state that Why3 is capable of performing the safety analysis
without changing anything within the framework.
For the remaining two proof obligations of the CISE proof rule, our tool automati-
cally generates functions that verify the commutativity and stability between pairs of
operations. Given the code from the application, CISE3 uses Why3’s parser to obtain
an in memory representation of the contents of the WhyML program. After the pro-
gram is parsed, for each pair of different operations a commutativity analysis function is
generated automatically, which also verifies the stability between those operations.
For the generic application presented in Figure 3.2, our tool only generates one func-
tion for the commutativity and stability analysis between operations f and g. The gen-
erated function is presented in Figure 3.3. If Why3 is able to prove that the function
presented in Figure 3.3 respects the specification, then operations f and g commute and
do not conflict. This function starts by generating two equal states of the application, as
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well as the arguments for each operation in lines 3 to 6. The construction val..in is used
in WhyML to generate a constant of a certain type. For instance, the expression in line 4
generates a value of type τ , binding such value to the variable state1. An expression of
the form (val x : γ in) is syntactic sugar for (let x = any γ in). The next step is
the assume expression in line 7, which has the purpose of restricting the values that the
generated arguments can possess in order to preserve the preconditions of the operations
being analysed. The assume expression also states that both generated states must be the
same, because f and g are executed in alternative orders but both orders of execution must
start from the same initial state. Then operation f is executed, followed by the execution
of operation g over state1, in lines 8 and 9. This execution of f and g is followed by the
alternative order of execution but over state2 in lines 10 and 11. After these alternated
executions of operations f and g, if the final states are the same then we assume that f and
g commute. To verify if two states are the same, the postcondition uses a state equality
relation (eq). This equality relation is a field by field comparison of the record type of
the state of the application. The equality relation between states can be automatically
generated by our tool, if the programmer does not provide one. In Chapter 4 we present
several case studies that require an equality relation provided by the programmer.
For the stability analysis in the function of Figure 3.3, we try to prove the preservation
of the precondition of an operation after the execution of another operation, (e.g., the
precondition of g in the state obtained after the execution of f). So, in the first order
of execution over state1 we check if the preconditions of operation g are preserved and
in the second order of execution over state2, our tool tries to prove the preservation of
the preconditions of operation f. If we are not able to prove one of these two assertions,
then we assume that f and g are conflicting and that they cannot be safely executed
concurrently. Otherwise, f and g are not conflicting. This way, we can perform the
commutativity and stability analysis for each pair of different operations in a single step.
One important remark regarding the generated functions by our tool, is the name of
the arguments that are generated inside them. The generated arguments do not have the
same names as in the operations signature, because our tool changes them due to possible
conflicts that can occur between argument names of different operations. In order to solve
this issue, our tool adds a suffix after the name of each argument, thus avoiding any name
clashes. Also, in the assume expression our tool changes the names of the variables in
the preconditions of the analysed operations, so there is a match with the new generated
names.
For the remaining stability analysis, our tool generates a function for each operation.
Each of these remaining functions have the purpose of checking if there can be multiple
concurrent executions of the same operation. Given the generic program presented in
Figure 3.2, to check the stability of operations f and g, our tool generates the functions
presented in Figure 3.4.
The functions presented in Figure 3.4 start by generating the initial state and the
arguments for the operation calls in lines 2 to 5 and in lines 11 to 14. Similar to the
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1 let ghost f_stability () : ()
2 = val x1 : τ1 in
3 val state1 : τ in
4 val x2 : τ1 in
5 assume { P1 (x1,state1) ∧
6 P1 (x2,state1)}
7 f x1 state1;
8 f x2 state1;
9
10 let ghost g_stability () : ()
11 = val x1 : τ2 in
12 val state1 : τ in
13 val x2 : τ2 in
14 assume { P2 (x1,state1) ∧
15 P2 (x2,state1)}
16 g x1 state1;
17 g x2 state1;
18
Figure 3.4: Generated stability analysis function for operations f and g.
commutativity analysis functions, the assume expression in line 6, for example, is also
used to restrict the values that the generated arguments and states can take so the pre-
conditions of the operation being analysed can be preserved. Lastly, the operation is
executed consecutively in lines 7 to 8 and in lines 16 to 17. To check if an operation is not
conflicting with itself, we use our tool to try to prove this stability analysis function. In
case we are not able to prove the generated function, due to a violation of a precondition
on the second call to the operation, then we assume that there cannot be multiple concur-
rent executions of that operation. As it was pointed out for the commutativity analysis
function, in the stability analysis functions the name of the generated arguments and the
assume expression suffer modifications, to avoid name clashes between arguments from
different operations.
3.3 Token System Component
After the analyses from our tool are performed, the programmer is aware of the pairs
of conflicting operations of the application. With this information the programmer can
provide a token system to our tool and check if the consistency model that it represents
is sound. This is done by executing CISE3 over the application’s specification once again.
Given the token system, if we are able to discharge every generated verification condition,
then the associated consistency model is considered sound. The programmer can execute
our tool several times iteratively refining the token system each time, in order to find
the less strict consistency model that guarantees data integrity. The idea of defining a
token system to represent the consistency models of an application comes from CISE, as
explained in Section 2.8. In Chapter 4 we show some examples of the definition of token
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tokenSystem ::= tokenDef
| conflictsDef
tokensDef ::= token tokensDef
| token
token ::= token opId tokenId+
| argtoken opId argId tokenId
conflictsDef ::= conflict conflictsDef
| conflict
conflict ::= tokenId conflicts tokenId
Figure 3.5: BNF that represents our provided token system specification language.
systems for our case studies, as well as its repercussions in the execution of our tool.
In Figure 3.5 we present the grammar of our DSL for specifying token systems. The
first two productions from the grammar are straight forward so firstly we focus on the
token production. The first rule from the token production, describes the declaration of a
non-empty list of tokens, associated with an operation. Each token can only be declared
once, as it cannot be associated to more than one operation. The second rule from the
token production describes the association of tokens to arguments of an operation. The
last production, illustrates how the programmer can declare two tokens as being in con-
flict. The tokens that are used in the conflict production must both have been defined
previously. When two tokens declared with the keyword token are conflicting, the opera-
tions associated to those tokens cannot be executed concurrently in any situation. In this
case, our tool will not generate any analysis function regarding the analysis for the pair of
conflicting operations. If two tokens that were declared with the argtoken keyword are
conflicting, the operations associated to the tokens can only execute concurrently if the
value of the arguments are different. In this case, our tool assumes that two operations
with conflicting arguments only execute concurrently when the values of the arguments
are different.
To illustrate our token system specification language let us consider the following
example: our tool is executed over the application from Figure 3.2 and finds out operation
f is conflicting with itself. Given this information, the programmer can provide the
following token system:
1 token f tau
2 tau conflicts tau
The token system presented above shows a consistency model where operation f
should not be safely executed in concurrence with itself in any situation. So, given this
token system our tool does not generate the stability analysis f_stability. However, let
us consider that the conflict regarding operation f is only related to one of its parameters
arg. In this case the programmer can provide a more refined token system like the one
below:
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1 argtoken f arg tau
2 tau conflicts tau
Now, this token system depicts a consistency model where f can only be safely exe-
cuted concurrently when the value of arg is different in each concurrent execution of f.
Given this new token system, our tool changes the assume expression from the f_stability
function in Figure 3.4. The new assume expression is presented below:
1 assume { P1 (x1,state1) ∧ P1 (x2,state1) ∧ (arg1 , arg2)}
3.4 CRDTs library Component
A mostly frequent issue that can occur in geo-replicated systems is data divergence due
to the execution of non-commutative operations, in different orders in different replicas.
A possible solution to this issue is the introduction of CRDTs in the application code. As
mentioned in Section 2.4, CRDTs guarantee the convergence of data in a self-established
way. With this in mind, we present a library of CRDTs implemented and verified using
the Why3 framework. The goal of this library is to provide programmers with a verified
solution in order to solve commutativity issues that are uncovered by our tool. The
programmer can also provide its own CRDT specifications in WhyML and use them to
solve commutativity issues. In Chapter 4 we show a case study where a CRDT is used to
solve a commutativity issue discovered by our tool. Also, all the CRDTs implemented for
our library are presented in Appendix A.
3.5 Strongest Postcondition Component
As previously mentioned the goal of our approach is to help the programmer reason about
the correctness of weakly consistent distributed applications. Even if the programmer
only has to provide the specification of the application, finding the best specification for
an application can be a tough task. So, in order to help the programmer with this chore
we provide a strongest postcondition generator. This predicate transformer can be used
by the programmer in case she needs help reasoning about the postconditions of each
operation, as stated in Section 2.7.
For this component we provide a DSL to write specifications targeting our strongest
postcondition calculus. This DSL is similar to a subset of the WhyML language, making
it easier for the programmer to integrate the generated postcondition in the application.
The input the programmer needs to provide to our predicate transformer consists of
the implementation and preconditions of the operation. Our strongest postcondition
generator follows the rules presented in Table 2.2. Another important remark about this
DSL is that it does not support any form of loop constructors. In Chapter 4 we present
some case studies where we applied our strongest postcondition calculus.
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Let us discuss some design choices regarding our predicate transformer and its target
language. First of all, the case studies evaluated by our tool do not have global variables.
This departs away from a more traditional presentation of a strongest postcondition
calculus [17]. Every variable used in an operation is passed as a parameter, which can
raise the problem of aliasing. In order to explain how we cope with this issue let us first
consider the following signature for operation f:
1 val f (x : τ1) (state: τ) : τres
According to the type system from Why3 [24], all arguments from an operation are
separated from each other, using here some Separation Logic vocabulary [43]. By that we
mean that there are no two arguments pointing to the same memory location. Since our
predicate transformer only has in consideration the arguments of the operation, then the
problem of aliasing is mitigated.
Another implementation choice regarding our predicate transformer is related to
the integrity invariants over the state. Our predicate transformer does not include the
integrity invariants in the generated postconditions. We make this choice because when
the programmer writes the specification of an application in Why3, she does not need
to explicitly include the state invariants. Why3 automatically adds any type invariants
as a precondition and postcondition of operations. So, since Why3 inserts the integrity
invariants by itself, our predicate transformer does not need to do it.
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Experimental Evaluation
In this chapter we evaluate our tool over a set of three case studies: a banking application,
an auction application, and a school registration application.
4.1 Banking Application
In this section we present a complete case study of a simple banking application. This
case study is similar to the example presented in Section 1.2. In this application we have
a set of bank accounts, over which a client can only deposit or withdraw money. For this
case we abstract the security aspects regarding which client can access which account,
with every client being able to access every account. The sequential implementation and
specification for this case study are presented in Figure 4.1.
The specification of operations deposit and withdraw are standard: it is not possible to
deposit or withdraw negative values and also a client cannot withdraw more money than
what is available in the account. The specified state of the application corresponds to a
record with just one field named balance, which represents the accounts with each index
of the array representing a different account. There is an integrity invariant associated to
the state of the application. This invariant states that at any point during the execution
of the application, the balance of each account must be non-negative. The proof effort for
this sequential program is presented in Figure 4.2. The green cells represent the verifica-
tion conditions that were discharged automatically by the specified external prover. That
being said this table shows that the safety analysis is successfully performed.
For this example the programmer needs to introduce the predicate state_equality
that represents the equality relation between states, as we can observe in Figure 4.1. In
order for our tool to identify state_equality as the equality relation between states, the
programmer must associate the tag [@state_eq]. If the programmer does not specify
29
CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
1 type state [@state] = {
2 balance : array int
3 } invariant{ forall i. 0 ≤ i < length balance → balance[i] ≥ 0 }
4
5 let deposit(accountId amount: int) (state : state): unit
6 requires { amount > 0 }
7 requires { accountId ≥ 0 ∧ accountId < length state.balance }
8 ensures { state.balance[accountId] =
9 old(state.balance)[accountId] + amount }
10 ensures { forall i. i , accountId →
11 state.balance[i] = (old state.balance)[i] }
12 = state.balance[accountId] ← state.balance[accountId] + amount
13
14 let withdraw(accountId amount: int) (state : state) : unit
15 requires { amount > 0 }
16 requires { state.balance[accountId] - amount ≥ 0 }
17 requires { accountId ≥ 0 ∧ accountId < length state.balance }
18 ensures { state.balance[accountId] =
19 old(state.balance)[accountId] - amount }
20 ensures { forall i. i , accountId →
21 state.balance[i] = (old state.balance)[i] }
22 = state.balance[accountId] ← state.balance[accountId] - amount
23
24 predicate state_equality [@state_eq] (s1 s2 : state)
25 = array_eq s1.balance s2.balance
26
Figure 4.1: Specification and implementation of the banking application.
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lemma VC for state 0.00 0.03 0.02
lemma VC for deposit 0.01 0.05 0.01
lemma VC for withdraw 0.01 0.05 0.01
Figure 4.2: Statistics regarding the proof of the banking application.
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the predicate state_equality, our tool automatically generates an equality relation, as
specified in Section 3.2. For the specific case of comparing arrays, a simple structural
comparison would not be sufficient to prove if they are equal. Therefore, in this case
there is the need for a point-wise comparison between the elements of the arrays, which
is accomplished by using the function array_eq from Why3 standard library.
When the programmer is writing the specification, she can use our strongest postcon-
dition predicate transformer to automatically obtain the postconditions for each opera-
tion. To execute our predicate transformer for operation deposit, the input the program-
mer needs to provide to our tool is the one below, followed by the generated postcondition:
1 deposit (amount, accountId : int) (state : state) : unit
2 requires {amount > 0}
3 requires {accountId ≤ (length (state.balance))}
4 requires {accountId > 0}
5 = state.balance[accountId] ← (state.balance[accountId] + amount)
1 exists v0. state.balance[accountId] = v0 + amount &&
2 amount > 0 &&
3 accountId ≤ length (state.balance) &&
4 accountId > 0
The generated postcondition states that there exists a value v0 representing the previ-
ous balance of the account which is accessed by the index accountId. Then, a value amount
is deposited to the balance of the account v0. The remaining information refers to the
propagation of the preconditions of operation deposit. Now the programmer can repeat
the process for operation withdraw by providing the specification for the operation. The
specification for withdraw, followed by the generated postcondition, is presented below:
1 withdraw (amount, accountId : int) (state : state) : unit
2 requires {amount > 0}
3 requires {accountId ≤ (length (state.balance))}
4 requires {accountId > 0}
5 requires {(balance[accountId] - amount) ≥ 0 }
6 = state.balance[accountId] ← (state.balance[accountId] + amount)
1 exists v0 . state.balance[accountId] = v0 + amount &&
2 amount > 0 &&
3 accountId ≤ length (state.balance) &&
4 accountId > 0 &&
5 v0 - amount ≥ 0
The generated postcondition states that there exists a value v0 representing the previ-
ous balance of the account being accessed by the index accountId. Then, a value amount
is removed from the balance of the account v0. The remaining information from the
generated postcondition refers to the propagation of the preconditions from the withdraw
operation.
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1 let ghost deposit_withdraw_commutativity () : (state, state)
2 ensures { match result with
3 | x1, x2 → state_equality x1 x2
4 end }
5 = val ghost accountId1 : int in
6 val ghost amount1 : int in
7 val ghost state1 : state in
8 val ghost accountId2 : int in
9 val ghost amount2 : int in
10 val ghost state2 : state in
11 assume { ((amount1 > 0 ∧ accountId1 ≥ 0 ∧
12 accountId1 < length (balances state1)) ∧
13 amount2 > 0 ∧
14 ((balances state2)[accountId2] - amount2) ≥ 0 ∧
15 accountId2 ≥ 0 ∧
16 accountId2 < length (balances state2)) ∧
17 state_equality state1 state2 };
18 withdraw accountId2 amount2 state1;
19 deposit accountId1 amount1 state1;
20 deposit accountId1 amount1 state2;
21 withdraw accountId2 amount2 state2;
22 (state1, state2)
23
Figure 4.3: Generated commutativity analysis function for the bank application.
Comparing the postconditions of each operation from Figure 4.1 and the generated
postconditions, we verify that the latter are more verbose. However, they are automati-
cally generated. This helps the programmer to understand which postcondition must be
supplied. In fact, an appropriate witness for the existentially quantified variable v0 is
(old state).balance, with which we recover the postconditions supplied in Figure 4.1.
In the implementation presented in Figure 4.1 we can observe that the application
only has two operations: deposit and withdraw. Since there is only one pair of different
operations, our tool only generates a single function for the commutativity analysis. The
generated function is presented in Figure 4.3.
In the function of Figure 4.3 we start by generating the arguments amount1, accountId1,
state1, amount2, accountId2, and state2 which are used for the calls to operations deposit
and withdraw. The expression assume has the purpose of restricting the space of possible
combinations of values for the generated arguments, so that the preconditions of the
analysed operations are preserved and both generated states are equal. After that, op-
eration withdraw is executed over state1 followed by the execution of operation deposit
over state1. If we are not able to prove that the preconditions of the call to deposit
are preserved, then we assume that deposit and withdraw are conflicting and cannot be
safely executed concurrently. Afterwards, operation deposit is executed over state2,
followed by the execution of operation withdraw over state2. As it was done with the
previous order of execution of operations, for this sequence if we are not able to prove
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1 let ghost withdraw_stability () : unit
2 = let ghost accountId1 = any int in
3 let ghost amount1 = any int in
4 let ghost state1 = any state in
5 let ghost accountId2 = any int in
6 let ghost amount2 = any int in
7 assume { (amount1 > 0 ∧
8 ((balances state1)[accountId1] - amount1) ≥ 0 ∧
9 accountId1 ≥ 0 ∧ accountId1 < length (balances state1)) ∧
10 amount2 > 0 ∧
11 ((balances state1)[accountId2] - amount2) ≥ 0 ∧
12 accountId2 ≥ 0 ∧ accountId2 < length (balances state1) };
13 withdraw accountId1 amount1 state1;
14 withdraw accountId2 amount2 state1
15
16 let ghost deposit_stability () : unit
17 = let ghost accountId1 = any int in
18 let ghost amount1 = any int in
19 let ghost state1 = any state in
20 let ghost accountId2 = any int in
21 let ghost amount2 = any int in
22 assume { (amount1 > 0 ∧
23 accountId1 ≥ 0 ∧ accountId1 < length (balances state1)) ∧
24 amount2 > 0 ∧
25 accountId2 ≥ 0 ∧ accountId2 < length (balances state1) };
26 deposit accountId1 amount1 state1;
27 deposit accountId2 amount2 state1
28
Figure 4.4: Generated stability analysis functions for the bank application.
the preservation of the preconditions of withdraw, then we assume deposit and withdraw
are conflicting and cannot be safely executed concurrently. Lastly, a pair containing both
final states state1 and state2 is returned, and if they are equal we know that deposit and
withdraw commute. In this case, we are able to prove every verification condition gener-
ated by this function, meaning that operations deposit and withdraw commute and do
not conflict. That said, these operations can be safely executed concurrently because they
do not put data integrity at risk. Since there are no commutativity issues regarding these
operations, there is no need to introduce a CRDT in this application. So, with function
deposit_withdraw_commutativity we are able to execute the stability and commutativity
analysis between deposit and withdraw in one step.
Now, we proceed to the remaining stability analysis where we verify for each operation
if there can be multiple concurrent executions of said operation. For this analysis, our
tool generates a stability analysis function for each operation of the application. In this
case study, our tool generates the stability analysis functions presented in Figure 4.4.
Initially, every stability analysis function generates the arguments that will be used in
the calls to the operation, as we saw in the commutativity analysis function. Also, similar
to the commutativity analysis function, the assume expression restricts the search space
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VC for deposit withdraw commutativity 0.07 (5s) FAILURE
VC for withdraw stability precondition 1 0.00
precondition 2 0.00
precondition 3 0.01
precondition 4 0.00
precondition 5 (1s) (1s) FAILURE
precondition 6 0.00
VC for deposit stability 0.00 0.02 0.01
Figure 4.5: Statistics of the proof effort for the generated functions for the bank applica-
tion.
of values that the arguments can take so that the preconditions of the first operation call
are preserved. Additionally, the assume expression is used to ensure that both generated
states are equal. After that, the operation being analysed is called consecutively, and
we are not able to prove the preservation of the preconditions of the operation prior to
the second call, then that operation is conflicting with itself. In this case study, every
verification condition for function deposit_stability is proved automatically, ensuring
that deposit is not conflicting with itself. However, for the stability analysis function
withdraw_stability, we are not able to prove the preservation of the preconditions for
the second operation call. This means that withdraw is conflicting with itself, therefore,
there cannot be multiple concurrent executions of this operation. The proof effort for the
commutativity and stability analysis functions can be seen in Figure 4.5. In this table we
can see that precondition 5 cannot be proved by any external prover available. It is this
precondition that makes us assume that withdraw is conflicting with itself.
As we observed in Section 2.8, a token system can be used to specify a specific con-
sistency model over an application. Since the analysis phase of our tool is complete, the
programmer already knows which operations are conflicting, and in this case there is
only one conflict: withdraw is conflicting with itself. The programmer must supply a
token system, which can then be analysed by our tool. A sound token system for this
application can be seen below:
1 token withdraw tau
2 tau conflicts tau
This token system defines a token tau which is associated to operation withdraw and it
conflicts with itself. That said, our tool does not generate the stability analysis function for
withdraw. Consequently, our tool only generates the functions deposit_withdraw_commutativity
and deposit_stability, which we have seen in this section to have been automatically
proved. So, every generated verification condition is proved automatically, thus the token
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1 assume { (amount1 > 0 ∧
2 ((balances state1)[accountId1] - amount1) ≥ 0 ∧
3 accountId1 ≥ 0 ∧ accountId1 < length (balances state1)) ∧
4 amount2 > 0 ∧
5 ((balances state1)[accountId2] - amount2) ≥ 0 ∧
6 accountId2 ≥ 0 ∧ accountId2 < length (balances state1) ∧
7 accountId1 , accountId2 };
8
Figure 4.6: Assume expression of withdraw_stability given the token system.
system and its underlying consistency model are considered sound.
Realistically, if the application from this case study is executed under the consistency
model presented above, when a user is trying to withdraw money from an account, no
other client can be withdrawing money from any account. So, this consistency model is
too strict for the application and heavily decreases its availability. However, if we analyse
the conflict of the withdraw operation, then we understand it is related specifically to the
argument accountId instead of the operation as a whole. That said, the programmer can
now provide another (more refined) token system to our tool to check its soundness. This
new token system is presented below:
1 argtoken withdraw accountId tau
2 tau conflicts tau
This new token system states that the argument accountId of the operation withdraw,
that has the token tau associated, is conflicting with itself. That said, our tool modifies
the assume expression from operation withdraw_stability, adding the restriction that the
argument accountId must have different values in each concurrent execution of operation
withdraw. The modified assume expression is presented in Figure 4.6. With this modi-
fication in the assume expression, every generated verification condition is discharged,
meaning that the token system presented above, and its underlying consistency model
are sound.
4.2 Auction Application
In this section we present another complete case study, this time of a simple auction
application. This application consists of a collection of bids, the winning bid of the
auction and a flag that indicates if the auction is still open. For this application, we
also abstract from security aspects such as which user of the application can close the
auction, with every user being able to do so. The implementation and specification for
this application is presented in Figure 4.7.
The auction application has two operations: place_bid to place a bid, and close_auction
to close the auction. The specification for place_bid states that the bid that is going to
be placed must be non-negative, and the auction must be open. After the execution of
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1 type state [@state] = {
2 mutable bid : array int;
3 mutable winning_bid : int;
4 mutable open : bool
5 }
6 invariant{ if not(open) then
7 length bid ≥ 0 ∧
8 (forall i. ≥ 0 ∧
9 i < length bid → winning_bid ≥ bid[i])
10 else winning_bid ≤ 0 }
11 invariant{ if length bid > 0 then
12 (forall i. i ≥ 0 ∧
13 i < length bid → bid[i] > 0)
14 else length bid = 0 }
15
16 let place_bid (b : int) (state : state) : unit
17 requires { b > 0 }
18 requires { state.open }
19 requires { state.winning_bid ≤ 0 }
20 ensures { length state.bid = length (old state.bid) + 1 }
21 = state.bid ← append state.bid (make 1 b)
22
23 let close_auction (state : state) : unit
24 requires { length state.bid ≥ 0 }
25 requires { state.open }
26 requires { state.winning_bid ≤ 0 }
27 ensures { forall i. i ≥ 0 ∧
28 i < length state.bid → (state.winning_bid ≥ state.bid[i])}
29 ensures{not(state.open) }
30 = for i = 0 to length state.bid - 1 do
31 invariant{ forall j. j ≥ 0 ∧
32 j < i → state.winning_bid ≥ state.bid[j] }
33 if state.bid[i] > state.winning_bid then
34 state.winning_bid ← state.bid[i]
35 done;
36 state.open ← false
37
38 predicate state_equality [@state_eq] (s1 s2 : state)
39 = val predicate (==) (b1 b2: bool)
40 ensures { result ↔ b1 = b2 } in
41 (array_eq s1.bid s2.bid) &&
42 (s1.winning_bid = s2.winning_bid) &&
43 (s1.open == s2.open)
44
Figure 4.7: Specification and implementation of the auction application.
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lemma VC for state 0.00 0.03 0.01
lemma VC for place bid 0.03 0.04 0.01
lemma VC for close auction 0.02 0.05 0.02
Figure 4.8: Statistics regarding the proof of the auction application.
operation place_bid the new bid is placed in the collection of bids. The specification for
close_bid states that the auction must be open, and there must be at least one bid. After
the execution of operation close_auction, the auction is closed and the winning bid of the
auction is decided. We associate two integrity invariants to the state of the application.
The first invariant states that at any point during the execution, if the auction is open
then the winning bid is negative, but when the auction is closed, then it must be greater
or equal then any bid from the collection of bids. The second invariant states that at any
point during the execution every bid from the collection of bids, is non-negative. The
proof effort for this sequential program is presented in Figure 4.8.
When the programmer is writing the specification, she can use our strongest post-
condition predicate transformer to automatically obtain the postconditions for each op-
eration. To execute our predicate transformer for operation place_bid, the input the
programmer needs to provide to our tool is the one below, followed by the generated
postcondition:
1 place_bid (b : int) (state : state) : unit
2 requires { b > 0 }
3 requires { state.open }
4 requires { state.winning_bid ≤ 0 }
5 = state.bid ← append (state.bid, make (1,b))
1 exists v0. state.bid = append (v0, make (1,b)) &&
2 b > 0 &&
3 state.open &&
4 state.winning_bid ≤ 0
The generated postcondition states that there exists a value v0 representing the previ-
ous collection of placed bids. Then, a bid b is inserted in v0. The remaining information
from the generated postcondition refers to the propagation of the preconditions from
the place_bid operation. As for operation close_auction, we cannot apply our predicate
transformer. This happens because our strongest postcondition calculus does not support
any kind of loop constructors.
Comparing the postconditions of each operation from Figure 4.7 and the generated
postcondition for place_bid, we verify that the latter are more verbose. However, they
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1 let ghost place_bid_close_auction_commutativity () : (state,state)
2 ensures { match result with
3 | x1, x2 → state_equality x1 x2
4 end }
5 = let ghost b1 = any int in
6 let ghost state1 = any state in
7 let ghost state2 = any state in
8 assume { ((b1 > 0 ∧
9 open state1 = True ∧
10 winning_bid state1 ≤ 0 ∧
11 (forall i:int.
12 i ≥ 0 ∧ i < length (bid state1) → (bid state1)[i] > 0)) ∧
13 length (bid state2) ≥ 0 ∧
14 open state2 = True ∧
15 winning_bid state2 ≤ 0 ∧
16 (forall i:int.
17 i ≥ 0 ∧ i < length (bid state2) → (bid state2)[i] > 0)) ∧
18 state_equality state1 state2 };
19 close_auction state1;
20 place_bid b1 state1;
21 place_bid b1 state2;
22 close_auction state2;
23 (state1, state2)
24
Figure 4.9: Generated commutativity analysis function for the auction application.
are automatically generated. This helps the programmer to understand which postcon-
dition must be supplied. In fact, an appropriate witness for the existentially quantified
variable v0 is (old state).bid, with which we recover the postconditions supplied in
Figure 4.7.
Similar to the banking application, in this case study the programmer also needs to
specify the equality relation between sets state_equality. Since there is only one pair of
different operations, our tool only generates one function for the commutativity analysis
for the auction application. The generated function is illustrated in Figure 4.9. In this
case, we are not able to prove that the preconditions of operation place_bid are preserved
after the execution of operation close_auction. This happens because by closing the
auction, the flag open from the state of the application is changed, and in order for a user
to place a bid, the auction must be open. That said, we assume that these operations
cannot be safely executed concurrently. Since there is a verification condition that is not
discharged, prior to the return of the pair of the final states, one cannot check if the states
are the same, so we assume they do not commute. Similar to the bank application, in this
case study there is not a commutativity issue that can be solved with the introduction of
a CRDT in the system.
In this case study, our tool generates the stability analysis functions that are presented
in Figure 4.10. Every verification condition generated for function place_bid_stability
is discharged, ensuring that it is not conflicting with itself. However, for the stability
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1 let ghost close_auction_stability () : ()
2 = let ghost state1 = any state in
3 assume { (length (bid state1) ≥ 0 ∧
4 open state1 = True ∧
5 w state1 ≤ 0 ∧
6 (forall i:int.
7 i ≥ 0 ∧ i < length (bid state1) → (bid state1)[i] > 0)) ∧
8 length (bid state1) ≥ 0 ∧
9 open state1 = True ∧
10 w state1 ≤ 0 ∧
11 (forall i:int.
12 i ≥ 0 ∧ i < length (bid state1) → (bid state1)[i] > 0) };
13 close_auction state1;
14 close_auction state1
15
16 let ghost place_bid_stability () : ()
17 = let ghost b1 = any int in
18 let ghost state1 = any state in
19 let ghost b2 = any int in
20 assume { (b1 > 0 ∧
21 open state1 = True ∧
22 w state1 ≤ 0 ∧
23 (forall i:int.
24 i ≥ 0 ∧ i < length (bid state1) → (bid state1)[i] > 0)) ∧
25 b2 > 0 ∧
26 open state1 = True ∧
27 w state1 ≤ 0 ∧
28 (forall i:int.
29 i ≥ 0 ∧ i < length (bid state1) → (bid state1)[i] > 0) };
30 place_bid b1 state1;
31 place_bid b2 state1
32
Figure 4.10: Generated stability analysis functions for the auction application.
analysis function close_auction_stability, we are not able to prove the preservation of
the preconditions for the second call to the operation so close_auction. This happens
because once an auction is closed, then it cannot be closed again. The proof effort for the
commutativity and stability analysis functions can be seen in Figure 4.11.
In this application, there are some conflicts between operations, specifically close_auction
conflicts with place_bid and with itself. Since at this point the analysis of the application
is done, the programmer is aware of the conflicting operations so now she can provide a to-
ken system to our tool, and verify if it is sound. A sound token system for this application
can be seen below:
1 token close_auction t1
2 token place_bid t2
3 t1 conflicts t1
4 t1 conflicts t2
This token system above states that operation close_auction has associated the token
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lemma VC for place bid close auction commutativity lemma precondition 0.01
lemma precondition 0.00
lemma precondition 0.01
lemma precondition 0.00
lemma precondition (1s) 0.03 FAILURE
lemma precondition 0.01
lemma precondition 0.01
lemma precondition 0.00
lemma precondition 0.01
lemma precondition 0.01
lemma precondition 0.01
lemma precondition 0.01
lemma precondition 0.01
lemma precondition 0.01
lemma postcondition (1s) 0.04 FAILURE
lemma VC for close auction stability lemma precondition 0.01
lemma precondition 0.00
lemma precondition 0.00
lemma precondition 0.00
lemma precondition (1s) 0.02 FAILURE
lemma precondition 0.00
lemma VC for place bid stability 0.01
Figure 4.11: Statistics of the proof effort of the generated functions for the auction appli-
cation.
t1 and operation place_bid has associated the token t2. The conflict relation from the
token system says that the operation close_auction is conflicting with itself and with
operation place_bid. As presented in Section 3.3, when two operation-level tokens are de-
clared as conflicting, our tool does not generate any verification condition for its analysis.
That said, for this application our tool would only generate the verification conditions for
the stability analysis of the place_bid operation. So, the consistency model depicted by
this token system, states that the only operation that can be safely executed concurrently
with another operation is place_bid, only being able to be safely executed concurrently
with itself. This consistency model is very strict for the application however, it cannot be
further refined so it is the less strict consistency model that preserves data integrity.
4.3 Courseware Application
In this section we present a last case study. It consists of a school registration system com-
posed by a set of students, a set of courses and an enrollment relation between students
and courses. As we did in the previous case studies, for this application we also abstract
from security aspects, such as any user being able to perform any action offered by the
application’s API. The implementation and specification for this application is illustrated
in Figure 4.12.
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1 type state [@state] = {
2 mutable students : fset int;
3 mutable courses : fset int;
4 mutable enrolled : fset (int,int);
5 }
6 invariant{ forall i,j. mem (i,j) enrolled →
7 mem i students ∧ mem j courses }
8
9 let ghost addCourse (course : int) (state : state): unit
10 requires { course > 0 }
11 ensures {mem course state.courses}
12 = state.courses ← add course state.courses
13
14 let ghost addStudent (student : int) (state : state): unit
15 requires { student > 0 }
16 ensures {mem student state.students}
17 = state.students ← add student state.students
18
19 let ghost enroll (student course : int) (state : state): unit
20 requires { student > 0 ∧ course > 0 }
21 requires { mem student state.students }
22 requires { mem course state.courses }
23 ensures { mem (student,course) state.enrolled }
24 = state.enrolled ← add (student,course) state.enrolled
25
26 let ghost remCourse (course : int) (state : state): unit
27 requires { course > 0 }
28 requires { forall i. not (mem (i, course) state.enrolled) }
29 ensures { not (mem course state.courses) }
30 ensures { forall c. c , course →
31 mem c (old state).courses ↔ mem c state.courses }
32 = state.courses ← remove course state.courses
33
34 predicate state_equality [@state_eq] (s1 s2 : state)
35 = s1.students == s2.students &&
36 s1.courses == s2.courses &&
37 s1.enrolled == s2.enrolled
38
Figure 4.12: Specification of the courseware application.
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lemma VC for state 0.01 0.07 0.03
lemma VC for addCourse 0.01 0.06 0.05
lemma VC for addStudent 0.01 0.08 0.03
lemma VC for enroll 0.02 0.10 0.08
lemma VC for remCourse lemma type invariant 0.02 0.04 0.02
lemma postcondition 0.01 0.03 0.02
lemma postcondition 0.01 0.03 0.03
Figure 4.13: Statistics regarding the proof of the auction application.
In this application, addCourse adds a new course to the system, addStudent adds a
new student to the system, enroll registers a student in a course, and remCourse removes
a course from the system. The specifications of operations addCourse and addStudent
are very similar in the sense that they ensure the course and student, respectively, are
inserted in the system. The specification for the enroll operation states that both the
student and the course that is going to be enrolled, must be in the system prior to its
execution. Operation enroll ensures that the student will be enrolled in the course after
its execution. Lastly, the specification for the remCourse operation indicates that the course
that is going to be removed must not have a student enrolled in it. Also, this operation
ensures that the specified course will be removed from the system, and the remaining
courses will stay in the system. Another important thing to notice about the specifications
of these operations is that they are all represented as ghost code. This happens because
functions add and remove of the fset library from Why3, must be executed in a ghost
environment. There is no issue with using ghost code in this case study, because the goal
of CISE3 is not to verify the executable code of a distributed application. Instead, we are
concerned with analysing relations between operations.
The state of this application is represented by a record with three fields, which are the
three sets that store the students, courses and the enrolment relation between students
and courses. There is one integrity invariant associated to the state of the application.
This invariant states that at any point during the execution, if any student is enrolled in
a course, then the student and course must exist in the system. The proof effort for this
sequential program can be observed in Figure 4.13.
Similar to the previous two case studies, in this application the programmer also
needs to specify a predicate (state_equality) used for the comparison between states.
In order to compare two sets in Why3, a simple structural comparison is not enough to
prove that one set is equal to another. To compare two sets one requires an extensional
equality relation over sets, which can be achieved by using the function == from the Why3
fset library.
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When the programmer is writing the specification, she can use our strongest postcon-
dition predicate transformer to automatically obtain the postconditions for each opera-
tion. To execute our predicate transformer over operation addCourse, the programmer
can provide to our tool the specification below, which is followed by the generated post-
condition:
1 addCourse (course: int) (state: state) : unit
2 requires {course > 0}
3 = state.courses ← add (state.courses,course)
1 exists v0. state.courses = add (v0,course) &&
2 course > 0
This postcondition states that there exists a value v0 of the type fset and that a
value course was inserted and the result of that insertion is now the set of courses of
the system state.courses. The remaining information refers to the preconditions of
operation addCourse. The input and output for the execution of our predicate transformer
for operation addStudent is similar to the one we present above. As for operation enroll,
the programmer provides the specification presented below, which is followed by the
generated postcondition:
1 enroll (student, course: int) (state: state) : unit
2 requires {student > 0}
3 requires {course > 0}
4 requires {mem (state.courses,course)}
5 requires {mem (state.students,student)}
6 = state.enrolled ← add (state.enrolled,[student,course])
1 exists v0. state.enrolled = add (v0, (student,course)) &&
2 student > 0 &&
3 course > 0 &&
4 mem (state.courses,course) &&
5 mem (state.students,student)
The generated postcondition presented above states that there exists a set v0 and that
the tuple (student,course) was inserted in it, and the result of that insertion is now
the relation enrolled from the system state.enrolled. The remaining information from
the generated postcondition refers to the preconditions of the enroll operation. Laslty,
since operation remCourse has a forall constructor in its preconditions, our strongest
postcondition calculus cannot be applied.
In Figure 4.12, we can observe four operations: addCouse, addStudent, enroll and
remCourse. Since the application has four operations, there are six pairs of different
operations. One of the generated functions for this application’s commutativity analysis
can be seen in Figure 4.14.
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1 let ghost enroll_remCourse_commutativity () : (state, state)
2 ensures { match result with
3 | x1, x2 → state_equality x1 x2
4 end }
5 = let ghost student1 = any int in
6 let ghost course1 = any int in
7 let ghost state1 = any state in
8 let ghost course2 = any int in
9 let ghost state2 = any state in
10 assume { (((student1 > 0 ∧ course1 > 0) ∧
11 mem student1 (students state1) ∧ mem course1 (courses state1)) ∧
12 course2 > 0 ∧
13 (forall i:int. not mem (i, course2) (enrolled state2))) ∧
14 state_equality state1 state2 };
15 remCourse course2 state1;
16 enroll student1 course1 state1;
17 enroll student1 course1 state2;
18 remCourse course2 state2;
19 (state1, state2)
20
Figure 4.14: Generated commutativity analysis function for enroll and remCourse.
In this case we are not able to prove that the preconditions of operation enroll are
preserved after the execution of remCourse. This happens because when remCourse re-
moves one course from the system, then that course can be the course that a student
is trying to enroll in a concurrent execution of operation enroll. That said, we assume
that these operations cannot be safely executed concurrently. Since our tool is not able
to prove every verification condition prior to the return of the pair of the final states,
one cannot check if the states are the same at the end, so we cannot assert anything
about their commutativity. Apart from the functions enroll_remCourse-commutativity
and addCourse_remCourse_commutativity, all the remaining functions regarding the com-
mutativity and stability analysis of pairs of different operations are proved automatically,
meaning that the operations involved in the remaining pairs commute and do not conflict.
The function addCourse_remCourse_commutativity shows us a typical commutativity
issue over sets, which is the concurrent removal and addition of elements. Let us con-
sider the following example: if in one replica a user tries to add the student Filipe and
consequently removes him from the system, and in another replica the alternative order
of execution occurs, then in one replica Filipe is in the system but in the other one he
is not. This commutativity issue can be easily solved with a CRDT from our provided
library. To solve this issue the programmer needs to replace the Why3 set, that stores the
collection of courses, by a Remove-Wins set CRDT. The new code of the application with
the introduction of the CRDT can be seen in Figure 4.15. The generated stability analysis
functions for this application are presented in Figure 4.16.
In this case study, every verification condition generated for every stability analysis
function is proved automatically, allowing us to assume that every operation can be
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1 type state [@state] = {
2 mutable students : fset int;
3 mutable courses : remove_wins_set int;
4 mutable enrolled : fset (int,int);
5 }
6 invariant{ forall i,j. mem (i,j) enrolled →
7 mem i students ∧ in_set j courses }
8
9 let ghost addCourse (course : int) (state : state): unit
10 requires { course > 0 }
11 ensures { state.courses.remove_wins_add =
12 add course (old state).courses.remove_wins_add }
13 ensures { state.courses.remove_wins_removes ==
14 (old state).courses.remove_wins_removes}
15 = add_element course state.courses
16
17 let ghost addStudent (student : int) (state : state): unit
18 requires { student > 0 }
19 ensures {mem student state.students}
20 = state.students ← add student state.students
21
22 let ghost enroll (student course : int) (state : state): unit
23 requires { student > 0 ∧ course > 0 }
24 requires { mem student state.students }
25 requires { in_set course state.courses }
26 ensures { mem (student,course) state.enrolled }
27 = state.enrolled ← add (student,course) state.enrolled
28
29 let ghost remCourse (course : int) (state : state): unit
30 requires { course > 0 }
31 requires { mem course state.courses.remove_wins_add}
32 requires { forall i . not (mem (i,course) state.enrolled)}
33 ensures { not (in_set course state.courses) }
34 ensures { forall c. c , course → mem c (old state).courses.
remove_wins_removes
35 ↔ mem c state.courses.remove_wins_removes}
36 = remove_element course state.courses
37
38 predicate state_equality [@state_eq] (s1 s2 : state)
39 = s1.students == s2.students &&
40 equal s1.courses s2.courses &&
41 s1.enrolled == s2.enrolled
42
Figure 4.15: Courseware application with a CRDT.
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1 let ghost remCourse_stability () : ()
2 = let ghost course1 = any int in
3 let ghost state1 = any state in
4 let ghost course2 = any int in
5 assume { (course1 > 0 ∧
6 (forall i:int. not mem (i, course1) (enrolled state1))) ∧
7 course2 > 0 ∧
8 (forall i:int. not mem (i, course2) (enrolled state1)) };
9 remCourse course1 state1;
10 remCourse course2 state1
11
12 let ghost enroll_stability () : ()
13 = let ghost student1 = any int in
14 let ghost course1 = any int in
15 let ghost state1 = any state in
16 let ghost student2 = any int in
17 let ghost course2 = any int in
18 assume { ((student1 > 0 ∧ course1 > 0) ∧
19 mem student1 (students state1) ∧ mem course1 (courses state1)) ∧
20 (student2 > 0 ∧ course2 > 0) ∧
21 mem student2 (students state1) ∧ mem course2 (courses state1) };
22 enroll student1 course1 state1;
23 enroll student2 course2 state1
24
25 let ghost addStudent_stability () : ()
26 = let ghost student1 = any int in
27 let ghost state1 = any state in
28 let ghost student2 = any int in
29 let ghost state2 = any state in
30 assume { state_equality state1 state2 ∧ student1 > 0 ∧ student2 > 0 };
31 addStudent student1 state1;
32 addStudent student2 state1
33
34 let ghost addCourse_stability () : ()
35 = let ghost course1 = any int in
36 let ghost state1 = any state in
37 let ghost course2 = any int in
38 let ghost state2 = any state in
39 assume { state_equality state1 state2 ∧ course1 > 0 ∧ course2 > 0 };
40 addCourse course1 state1;
41 addCourse course2 state1
42
Figure 4.16: Generated stability analysis functions for the courseware application.
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safely executed concurrently. The proof effort for the commutativity and stability analysis
functions prior to the introduction of a CRDT, is presented in Figure 4.17.
As mentioned before, in this application there is only one case of conflicting opera-
tions: enroll and remCourse. A possible solution for this conflict is the mutual exclusion
of these operations. This means that whenever there is the possibility of a concurrent
execution of enroll and remCourse, they must be executed sequentially to preserve data
integrity. One way for the programmer to check if this specific consistency model is sound
for this application, is to provide a token system that depicts it to our tool, and check if
every generated verification condition is proved. The token system that represents the
consistency model specified above is presented below:
1 token enroll t1
2 token remCourse t2
3 t1 conflicts t2
In this token system the programmer defines two tokens t1 and t2 that are associated
with operation enroll and remCourse respectively. The conflict relation of this token
system states that these tokens are conflicting. Given this token system, our tool does not
generate the function for the commutativity and stability analysis between enroll and
remCourse. That said, every generated verification condition is proved so the consistency
model represented by the token system is considered sound.
The consistency model associated to this token system is too strict for the application,
and decreases its availability by a significant amount. However, this consistency model
is not the best possible solution for this case study. By analysing the conflict involving
operations enroll and remCourse, we conclude that it is due to the argument course from
both operations. So, the programmer can refine the previous token system given this new
information. This new and more refined token system is shown below:
1 argtoken enroll course t1
2 argtoken remCourse course t2
3 t1 conflicts t2
The token system above states that the argument course from operation enroll has
associated the token t1 and the argument course from operation remCourse has associ-
ated the token t2, and t1 and t2 are conflicting. This means that operations enroll and
remCourse can only be executed if the values of the arguments course from each operation
are different. This solution is less strict than automatically disallowing their concur-
rent execution. Regarding the generated verification conditions by our tool, with the
newly provided token system, there is a change in the assume expression in the function
enroll_remCourse_commutativity, presented in Figure 4.18. The only difference from the
previous assume expression is the introduction of the assertion (not (course1 = course2)).
Given the above token system, every verification condition generated by our tool is proved
automatically, so the underlying consistency model is sound.
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lemma VC for enroll remCourse commutativity lemma precondition 0.02
lemma precondition 0.05
lemma precondition 0.02
lemma precondition 0.04
lemma precondition (1s) (1s) (1s)
lemma precondition 0.02
lemma precondition 0.05
lemma precondition 0.06
lemma precondition 0.02
lemma precondition (1s) (1s) (1s)
lemma postcondition 0.02
0.14
(1s) (1s) (1s)
lemma VC for addStudent remCourse commutativity lemma precondition 0.02
lemma precondition 0.05
lemma precondition 0.03
lemma precondition 0.02
lemma precondition 0.03
lemma precondition 0.05
lemma postcondition (1s) (1s) (1s)
0.08
0.04
lemma VC for addStudent enroll commutativity lemma precondition 0.03
lemma precondition 0.10
lemma precondition 0.06
lemma precondition 0.03
lemma precondition 0.03
lemma precondition 0.02
lemma precondition (1s) (1s) (1s)
lemma precondition 0.05
lemma postcondition (1s) (1s) (1s)
0.04
(1s) (1s) (1s)
lemma VC for addCourse remCourse commutativity lemma precondition 0.01
lemma precondition 0.05
lemma precondition 0.02
lemma precondition 0.01
lemma precondition 0.02
lemma precondition 0.05
lemma postcondition 0.02
(1s) (1s) (1s)
0.05
lemma VC for addCourse enroll commutativity lemma precondition 0.03
lemma precondition 0.06
lemma precondition 0.08
lemma precondition 0.01
lemma precondition 0.02
lemma precondition 0.03
lemma precondition 0.05
lemma precondition (1s) (1s) (1s)
lemma postcondition (1s) (1s) (1s)
lemma VC for addCourse addStudent commutativity lemma precondition 0.02
lemma precondition 0.02
lemma precondition 0.02
lemma precondition 0.03
lemma postcondition (1s) (1s) (1s)
(1s) (1s) (1s)
0.04
lemma VC for remCourse stability 0.06
lemma VC for enroll stability 0.06
lemma VC for addStudent stability 0.03
lemma VC for addCourse stability 0.03
Figure 4.17: Statistics of the proof effort of the generated functions for the courseware
application.
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1 assume { not course1 = course2 ∧
2 (((student1 > 0 ∧ course1 > 0) ∧
3 mem student1 (students state1) ∧
4 in_set course1 (courses state1)) ∧
5 course2 > 0 ∧
6 mem course2 (remove_wins_add (courses state2)) ∧
7 (forall i:int. not mem (i, course2) (enrolled state2))) ∧
8 state_equality state1 state2 };
9
Figure 4.18: Modified assume expression from enroll_remCourse_commutativity.
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Related Work
This chapter presents and discusses other tools used for the verification of weakly consis-
tent applications. We focus on static analysis tools since this is the focus of this thesis. In
the end of this chapter we present a table comparing every studied tool with the tool we
developed.
5.1 Quelea
Quelea is a declarative programming model and tool for eventually consistent data stores.
This tool offers an expressive contract language which allows the programmer to specify
fine-grained application consistency properties. It is implemented as an extension of
Haskell and runs over Cassandra, an eventually consistent distributed data store. The
proof obligations are discharged with the help of the Z3 SMT solver. After a contract
classification process occurs the most efficient and sound consistency level is assigned to
each operation of the application [49].
For mapping operations to the appropriate consistency levels, the programmer needs
to declare application-level consistency constraints on operations, as contracts. These
contracts specify the set of allowed operation executions of the operation that has the
associated contract. Any execution that does not show an anomaly is considered as a well-
formed execution. By specifying the set of allowed executions of an operation, Quelea
then uses Z3 to help with the process of contract classification. Contract classification
leverages the power of Z3 to verify which of the previous specifications is the weakest and
which one is the strongest. To show the comparison a ≤ relation is used, which says that
if a specification ψx does not guarantee the constraints from specification ψy then: ψx ≤
ψy. The consistency-level that is associated to the operation is the weakest consistency
level that enables the preservation of the constraints of the operation’s contract [49].
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For the process of contract classification there is the need of contracts for each store
consistency level and they must also be provided by the programmer. Quelea supports
eventual, causal and strong consistency for operations, and for transactions it supports
RC, MAV and RR. This feature is implemented on top of the interface exposed by Cassan-
dra [49].
Comparing with CISE3 specification effort, the complexity of specifying contracts in
Quelea is high and time consuming, since it makes the programmer reason about possi-
ble concurrent interferences. Additionally, there is no guarantee that the contracts are
sufficient to assure the preservation of the application’s invariants. Also, CISE3 offers
a strongest postcondition predicate transformer, which Quelea does not. Due to these
reasons, we can state that Quelea requires a more difficult specification process com-
pared with CISE3. One similarity between Quelea and CISE3, is that they both allow the
programmer to introduce CRDTs in the specification. Also, Quelea only supports one
external prover, Z3, whereas our tool supports a wider variety. Lastly, CISE3 and Quelea
are both capable of showing a counterexample whenever an issue is found.
5.2 Q9
Q9 is a programming framework for replicated data types (RDTs), equipped with a
bounded verification technique that discovers and fixes weak consistency anomalies au-
tomatically [33]. It is embedded in OCaml and its symbolic execution engine is imple-
mented as a compiler pass that follows the typecheking in the OCaml 4.03 compiler. This
framework is used to analyse applications that are executed on top of eventually consis-
tent data stores. With the help of a symbolic execution engine it is possible to provide
bounded guarantees regarding the correctness of a program. The symbolic execution
engine explores a search space of abstract executions of a program. Each member of the
search space corresponds to a state of the program parametrized over the bound on the
number of concurrent effects [33]. For the verification to be done, the programmer only
has to specify the invariants of the program.
The Q9 framework is divided into three components. The first component is a trans-
lator that translates high-level programs with implicit effects, to a representation with
explicit effects. This first component serves to prepare the high-level program to be anal-
ysed and verified. In the second component, the verifier, we have the symbolic execution
engine as its main element. It performs the bounded verification technique, given the
k-bound as an input, and it works in a loop with an SMT solver, Z3 for example. The
k-bound serves to bound the number of concurrent effects that can occur concurrently in
a program p. By bounding the number of concurrent effects we also bound the number
of replicas that process them. This framework does not tackle the problem of fully un-
bounded verification, it can only guarantee k-safety of a program [33]. The third and final
component, the solver, handles the automatic reparations of the program’s consistency
anomalies.
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The verification process executed in the second component progresses one operation
at a time and then one transaction at a time. Each operation/transaction is verified against
the current consistency model being analysed, starting at eventual consistency. If the ver-
ification determines the invariants are not preserved, then a counterexample is obtained
from the solver. After that, the symbolic execution engine in the verifier computes the
abstract representation, given the obtained counterexample. Then, the solver tests vari-
ous consistency models until it finds the less strict model that preserves the invariants,
given the abstract representation. Finally the solver informs the verifier of the selected
consistency model, and the verification process is repeated until all operations preserve
the program’s invariants. Otherwise, the strong consistency model is employed in the
system.
When the verification process is being carried out, the symbolic execution engine
generates verification conditions (VCs) for the SMT solver, based on the k-safety defi-
nition [33]. These VCs are then encoded as satisfiability queries in Z3, and if they are
satisfiable then the model that is being tested, can be used for the consistency repair
process, as stated above.
CISE3 does not restrict the number of concurrent effects that can occur over the state,
so CISE3 can guarantee a full verification of the application, instead of a bounded one.
However, Q9 has an automatic mechanism to repair issues discovered by the tool, and
CISE3 does not. Q9 also does not provide a strongest postcondition predicate transformer
but CISE3 does. This feature allows CISE3 to have a lighter specification process for the
programmer. Q9 also provides a collection of CRDT specifications, like CISE3. Also,
Q9 only supports one external prover, Z3, whereas our tool supports a wider variety.
Regarding the exhibition of counterexamples, both Q9 and CISE3 possess that feature.
5.3 Repliss
Repliss [52] is a verification tool used to reason about applications built over weakly
consistent databases. This tool allows programmers to write the consistency sensitive
code of their application using a domain specific language. Additionally, the programmer
also needs to write the specification of the program and its integrity invariants. Given
this information, Repliss translates this program into a sequential Why3 program, and if
this Why3 program is proved as being correct, then the initial program is ensured to be
correct.
The application’s code can employ CRDTs that are either provided by the underlying
database or by the programmer. This way the programmer delegates all synchronization
aspects to the database, which is the central idea of this tool and proof technique. De-
pending on the application, the programmer must decide which is the most adequate
data type, so its access becomes more efficient.
To verify if an application is correct, the tool avoids reasoning about all possible traces.
Instead, Repliss’s proof technique reasons about one procedure invocation at a time. In
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the scope of this tool, the applications offer to the clients an API, which consists of a set
of procedures that they can use to communicate with the application. An invocation of
a procedure executes code sequentially and interacts with the data store [52]. In order
to verify if a procedure invocation is correct, Repliss firstly checks if the initial state
maintains the invariant. Then, based on the application’s code, it verifies if the procedure
invocation maintains the invariant. When verifying a single procedure invocation, Repliss
does not consider concurrent executions at all program points. Since Repliss analyses
each procedure individually, its technique is modular like CISE’s proof rule.
In comparison with our tool, the DSL presented in Repliss is more limited than the
WhyML since it does not allow the programmer to write contracts for operations. So, by
developing our tool over Why3, we can write better specifications more easily. Other than
that, Repliss is similar to our tool in the sense that the reasoning about the operation’s
relations is done through the analysis of a sequential Why3 program. This allows the
programmer to introduce CRDTs in the application. Another difference this tool has com-
paring with CISE3, is the fact that the latter provides a strongest postcondition predicate
transformer to ease the specification process, while Repliss does not. Since Repliss tries to
prove a sequential Why3 program with the Why3 framework, then it can access the same
external provers as CISE3 and also display counterexamples when an issue is found.
5.4 Hamsaz
Hamsaz [31] is a static analysis tool that given a system’s specification and using the CVC4
SMT solver, decides the pairs of conflicting and dependent operations. The specification
of an object must include the state type and invariants as well as its operations [31]. The
goal of this tool is to automatically synthesize a correct-by-construction replicated system
that guarantees integrity and convergence. Also this system avoids unnecessary coordi-
nation having in mind the conflict and causal dependency relations between operations.
The tool uses a static analysis approach in order to calculate the conflict and dependency
relations. The core of Hamsaz’s approach is a sufficient condition for integrity and con-
vergence of replicated systems called well-coordination. Well-coordination states that
conflicting operations need synchronization, while operations that are dependent of each
other need causality.
In order to say that two operations are not conflicting they must S-commute and P-
concur with each other. Two operations S-conflict if from the same state prior to executing
those operations in different orders, results in different final states thus, requiring syn-
chronization. On the other hand, if from the same initial state, both orders of execution
of the operations reach the same final state, then they S-commute (state commute). Op-
eration o1 P-concurs (permissible-concurs) with operation o2 if o1 is invariant-sufficient
or if o1 P-R-commutes with o2 [31]. An operation is considered as invariant-sufficient
if it never breaks the invariant when it is executed. However, not all operations are
invariant-sufficient, for example in a bank application the withdraw operation could put
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the balance to a negative value thus, breaking the invariant. Operation o1 P-R-commutes
(permissible-right-commutes) with operation o2 if o1 stays permissible when executed
right after o2 [31]. Some operation o is said to be permissible in some state σ if it satisfies
the invariant in σ and if it still preserves it after its execution. If two operations do not
P-concur then they P-conflict (permissible conflict) and require synchronization.
As mentioned above, invariant-sufficient operations always preserve the invariant.
However, there are operations that only preserve the invariant depending on previous
operations calls. An operation o2 is considered as being independent of o1 if o2 is invariant-
sufficient or if it P-L-commutes with o1. An operation o2 is said to P-L-commute with
operation o1 if it remains permissible if executed prior to o1 [31]. If o2 is dependent of
o1 then the execution of o2 should be postponed, so o1 can be executed first.
Hamsaz’s analysis for the conflicting operations is similar to the the analysis con-
ducted by our tool. However, Hamsaz performs an analysis to find causally dependent
operations which CISE3 does not. This analysis allows Hamsaz to only assume eventual
consistency. Since CISE3 does not perform this analysis we assume causal consistency,
which is a less relaxed assumption. Another similarity between Hamsaz and CISE3 is
that both tools allow the use of CRDTs. An advantage that CISE3 has over Hamsaz is that
it provides a strongest postcondition predicate transformer that eases the specification
process. One disadvantage CISE3 has over Hamsaz is that the latter, offers a set of proto-
cols for the automatic resolution of conflicts. Lastly, CISE3 also supports more than one
external prover and is capable of displaying counterexamples whenever an issue is found
during the analysis of the application, but Hamsaz only offers the latter feature.
5.5 CISE tool
The first version of the CISE tool proposes an approach where the programmer needs
to provide the specification of the application’s operations, the state of the application,
and the integrity invariants. For each operation of the application the programmer needs
to also provide its sequential implementation. The analysis of this tool consists of per-
forming the three proof obligations from the CISE proof rule, like our tool does. This
tool automates the proof rule by discharging the generated verification conditions us-
ing an SMT solver, in this case Z3. If a verification condition is not discharged then a
counter example is provided, that the programmer can visualize in order to understand
the source of the issue [41]. However, the counterexamples presented by Z3 are difficult
to understand.
For this tool the programmer needs to interact directly with Z3 low level APIs directly,
making it difficult to specify the required input. Since CISE3 is implemented over Why3
we provide a high-level programming language (WhyML) making it easier to specify
the input for our tool, comparing with the first version of the CISE tool. Additionally,
our tool offers the programmer an automatic mechanism for the generation of strongest
postconditions, which this tool does not. That being said, the specification effort for the
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CISE tool is higher comparing with our tool. Also, the CISE tool only supports one prover,
the Z3 SMT solver, but CISE3 is implemented over Why3, so it supports a wider range of
external provers. Another advantage of CISE3 is that our token system language allows
the programmer to define more fine-grained tokens, instead of only allowing tokens at
operation level, like this tool does. Lastly CISE3 allows for the introduction of CRDTs in
the application in order to solve commutativity issues and the CISE tool does not.
5.6 CEC tool
The CEC tool is the second version of the CISE tool. This tool follows the same principle
as its predecessor however, it provides a high-level verification language, an extension
of Boogie [4, 40]. In CEC the programmer writes the specifications in Boogie, which
then generates a set of verification conditions. These verification conditions are then sent
to the Z3 SMT solver, to be discharged. Also, like its predecessor, the CEC tool is also
capable of showing a counterexample whenever a conflict is detected, thus helping the
programmer understand what caused the conflict [38].
As an input for the CEC tool the programmer needs to specify the operations, state,
and integrity invariants of the application. Each operation is defined as a sequence of
reads and updates and has a precondition associated. In order to define the consistency
model to be employed over the application, the programmer provides a token system
that consists of a set of tokens and a conflict relation over them, like in our tool and in
the CISE tool [38]. The CEC tool allows the programmer to specify parameters from
operations that are conflicting.
The specification effort from the CEC tool is similar to the one from CISE3, since in
both the programmer writes the specification using a high-level specification language.
However, CISE3 has the advantage of offering an automatic generator of strongest post-
conditions. Regarding the resolution of commutativity issues using CRDTs, both the CEC
tool and CISE3, support this feature. Another similarity is the performed analyses from
CEC and CISE3, since they both rely on the three proof obligations provided by the CISE
proof rule. Lastly, this tool only supports one external prover, the Z3 SMT solver, whereas
CISE3, since is implemented over Why3, supports a wider variety of external provers.
5.7 Tool Comparison
In this section we summarise the comparisons between every studied tool. To resume this
section, we also present Table 5.1.
Counterexamples: Every studied tool has the ability of producing a counterexample
when an issue is found. However, apart from Repliss and CISE3 the counterexamples
that are presented are hard to understand since they are presented in the language of
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the SMT solver used by the tool. Since Repliss and CISE3 use Why3 for the verification
process, then the counterexamples they produce are more readable.
Bounded Verification: From the studied tools Q9 is the only tool that bounds the num-
ber of possible concurrent updates for the verification process. This is a disadvantage
from the other studied tools, which do not perform a bounded verification process.
Automatic Resolution: Only Q9 and Hamsaz present an automatic resolution policy.
External Provers Support: Apart from Repliss and CISE3, every studied tool only sup-
ports one external prover, an SMT solver. Quelea, Q9, the CISE and CEC tools support
Z3 and Hamsaz supports CVC4. Since Repliss and CISE3 use Why3 for the verification
process, then they have access to more than 25 external provers.
Consistency Assumptions: CISE3 and its predecessors (CISE and CEC tools) assume
causal consistency because they are based on the proof rule from the CISE proof rule.
For CISE3 this assumption can be relaxed as discussed in Section 6.2. The remaining
analysed tools assume eventual consistency which is more relaxed when comparing to
CISE3.
CRDTs support: Only the CISE tool is not capable of supporting the introduction of
CRDTs in the application specification. Another positive point from CISE3 is that we also
provide a library of verified CRDTs that programmers can use.
Specification Effort: Comparing the specification efforts from all the studied tools, we
reach the conclusion that specifying applications for Quelea and the CISE tool is difficult.
For Quelea the programmer needs to specify fine-grained contracts about the operations
of the application and reason about concurrent interference from other operations. As
for the CISE tool, the programmer needs to use the low-level API’s from Z3 in order write
the specification.
Predicate Transformer: From the studied tools only CISE3 provides a predicate trans-
former, more precisely a strongest postcondition generator. This metric is also related
to the previous one, since the use of a predicate transformer simplifies the specification
effort for the programmer. This way we can say that the specification effort for CISE3 is
slightly easier comparing to the other studied tools.
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Counter
Examples
Bounded
Verification
Automatic
Resolution
External
Provers
Consistency
Assumptions
CRDTs
Support
Specification
Effort
Predicate
Transformer
Quelea Yes No No One Eventual
Consistency
Yes High No
Q9 Yes Yes Yes One Eventual
Consistency
Yes Average No
Repliss Yes No No Multiple Eventual
Consistency
Yes Average No
Hamsaz Yes No Yes One Eventual
Consistency
Yes Average No
CISE
tool
Yes No No One Causal
Consistency
No High No
CEC
tool
Yes No No One Causal
Consistency
Yes Average No
CISE3 Yes No No Multiple Causal
Consistency
Yes Average Yes
Table 5.1: Comparison between the studied tools.
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Conclusion
This chapter discusses the contributions from our work, and presents some future work
that can be done in order to improve said contributions.
6.1 Discussion
In this thesis we propose an automatic approach for the static analysis of weakly con-
sistent applications using the deductive verification framework Why3. To validate our
approach we designed several case studies which we analysed with our tool as seen in
Section 4.
The presented approach follows the proof rule proposed by CISE [28] and it takes
inspiration from previous tools implemented with the same purpose of trying to automate
the mentioned proof rule. Our approach is similar to these tools because it performs the
same analysis however, it improves them in the sense that it provides more features and
enhances the aspects already presented in the previous versions, as seen in Section 5.
To analyse an application we propose that the programmer provides as an input its
sequential specification and implementation. After that, the programmer uses CISE3 to
reason about the pairs of conflicting operations from the application. With this informa-
tion the programmer can then use a CRDT to solve commutativity issues, and specify
a token system in order to assess if a specific consistency model is sound over the ap-
plication. In order to aid the programmer’s specification effort, our tool also features a
strongest postcondition predicate transformer.
59
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
6.2 Future Work
From this work we propose some main directions regarding future work, that can improve
our approach and make it more robust.
Firstly we want to add the causal dependency analysis from Hamsaz [31] to our al-
ready existing set of analyses. This analysis is capable of finding the set of causally
dependent operations from an application. At this moment without this analysis our
approach assumes causal consistency however, with the introduction of this analysis we
are able to relax that assumption and switch it to eventual consistency. We already rea-
soned about how to include this analysis and we already have the solution. This is not yet
implemented, by the time of writing, but we expect to have it by the time of presentation.
Secondly we want to improve and expand our library of CRDTs. The CRDTs from
our current library have very simple implementations, which can be optimized. Also, by
expanding our library with more CRDTs, it can be used to solve commutativity issues
from a wider variety of examples.
Lastly, we want to expand our target language for our strongest postcondition calculus.
Currently our target language does not support any form of loop constructors so, our
goal is to make it support for...each loops. In applications that operate over replicated
databases, for...each constructors are the most used kind of loops, so it would be important
for our target language to support them. Also, since they are bounded loop constructors
it is easier to prove their termination. We intend to follow the approach presented by
Filliâtre and Pereira, who proposed a modular specification of iteration regardless of the
underlying implementation [22]. In particular, the authors show how to verify correctness
of several iteration clients and implementations, based on bounded loops in the style of
the for...each constructor.
6.3 Final Remarks
Ultimately, we believe the objectives we set for this thesis were fulfilled. We believe our
approach represents a valid means of analysing applications operating over replicated
databases. The planned future work will allow our approach to become more robust and
useful over a wider set of applications.
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A.1 Disable Once Flag
It is a flag that once it is disabled, it can never be enabled afterwards. This data structure
offers the following operations:
• initializeFlag (): Initialises the flag to an enabled state and resets the was_disabled
variable.
• enable (): Enables the flag iff the flag has not been disabled yet.
• disable (): Disables the flag.
• status (): Returns the status of the flag, either enabled or disabled.
• equals (doflag): Checks if two Disable Once Flags are equal.
The specification of this CRDT can be seen in Figure A.1.
A.2 Enable Once Flag
This is a flag similar to the previous one but in this case once it is enabled, it can never be
disabled afterwards. This data structure offers the following operations:
• initializeFlag(): Initialises the flag to a disabled state and resets the was_enabled
variable.
• enable(): Enables the flag.
• disable(): Disables the flag iff the flag has not been enabled yet.
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1 type ref_bool = { mutable b: bool }
2 val flag : ref_bool
3 val was_disabled : ref_bool
4
5 val initializeFlag () : unit
6 writes { flag, was_disabled }
7 ensures { flag.b }
8 ensures { not was_disabled.b }
9
10 val enable () : unit
11 requires { not was_disabled.b }
12 writes { flag }
13 ensures { flag.b }
14
15 val disable () : unit
16 writes { flag, was_disabled }
17 ensures { not flag.b }
18 ensures { was_disabled.b }
19
20 val status () : bool
21 ensures { result ↔ flag.b }
22
23 val equals (two : ref_bool) : bool
24 ensures { result ↔ flag.b = two.b }
Figure A.1: Disable Once flag in Why3.
• status(): Returns the status of the flag, either enabled or disabled.
• equals(eoFlag): Checks if two Enable Once Flags are equal.
The specification of this CRDT can be seen in Figure A.2.
A.3 Remove-wins Set
It is a set where a precedence is given to the remove operation. This set is able to resolve
the commutativity issues related to the addition and removal of elements from a set. This
data structure offers the following operations:
• add_element(elt): Adds the element elt to the remove_wins_add set.
• remove_element(elt): Adds the element elt, if it exists in the set, to the remove_wins_removes
set. Once this happens, elt will never be considered in the set even if it is added
later.
• in_set(elt,rwset): Checks if the element elt is inserted in the Remove-wins set
rwset.
• empty_set(): Returns an empty Remove-wins set.
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1 type ref_bool = { mutable b: bool }
2 val flag : ref_bool
3 val was_enabled : ref_bool
4
5 val initializeFlag () : unit
6 writes { flag, was_enabled }
7 ensures { not flag.b }
8 ensures { was_enabled.b }
9
10 val enable () : unit
11 writes { flag, was_enabled }
12 ensures { flag.b }
13
14 val disable () : unit
15 requires { not was_enabled.b }
16 writes { flag }
17 ensures { not flag.b }
18
19 val status () : bool
20 ensures { result ↔ flag.b }
21
22 val equals (two : ref_bool) : bool
23 ensures { result ↔ flag.b = two.b }
Figure A.2: Enable Once flag in Why3.
• equals(rwset1, rwset2): Checks if two Remove-wins sets are equal.
The specification of this CRDT can be seen in Figure A.3.
A.4 Add-wins Set
It is a similar set to the previous one but in this case the precedence is given to the addition
operation. This set is able to resolve the commutativity issues related to the addition and
removal of elements from a set. This data structure offers the following operations:
• add_element(elt): Adds the element elt to the remove_wins_add set. Once this
happens elt is considered to be in the set even if it is removed.
• remove_element(elt): Adds the element elt, if it exists in the set, to the remove_wins_removes
set.
• in_set(elt,rwset): Checks if the element elt is inserted in the Add-wins set awset.
• empty_set(): Returns an empty Add-wins set.
• equals(awset1, awset2): Checks if two Add-wins sets are equal.
The specification of this CRDT can be seen in Figure A.4.
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1 type remove_wins_set ’a = {
2 mutable remove_wins_add: fset ’a;
3 mutable remove_wins_removes: fset ’a;
4 }
5
6 let ghost predicate equal (s1 s2: remove_wins_set ’a) =
7 s1.remove_wins_add == s2.remove_wins_add &&
8 s1.remove_wins_removes == s2.remove_wins_removes
9
10 val empty_set () : remove_wins_set ’a
11 ensures { is_empty result.remove_wins_add }
12 ensures { is_empty result.remove_wins_removes }
13
14 predicate in_set (elt: ’a) (s: remove_wins_set ’a) =
15 mem elt s.remove_wins_add && not (mem elt s.remove_wins_removes)
16
17 val add_element (elt: ’a) (s: remove_wins_set ’a) : unit
18 writes { s.remove_wins_add }
19 ensures { s.remove_wins_add = add elt (old s).remove_wins_add }
20
21 val remove_element (elt: ’a) (s: remove_wins_set ’a) : unit
22 writes { s.remove_wins_removes }
23 ensures { s.remove_wins_removes = add elt (old s).remove_wins_removes }
24
Figure A.3: Remove-wins Set CRDT in Why3.
1 type add_wins_set ’a = {
2 mutable add_wins_add: fset ’a;
3 mutable add_wins_removes: fset ’a;
4 }
5
6 let ghost predicate equal (s1 s2: add_wins_set ’a) =
7 s1.add_wins_add == s2.add_wins_add &&
8 s1.add_wins_removes == s2.add_wins_removes
9
10 val empty_set () : add_wins_set ’a
11 ensures { is_empty result.add_wins_add }
12 ensures { is_empty result.add_wins_removes }
13
14 predicate in_set (elt: ’a) (s: add_wins_set ’a) =
15 mem elt s.add_wins_add
16
17 val add_element (elt: ’a) (s: add_wins_set ’a) : unit
18 writes { s.add_wins_add }
19 ensures { s.add_wins_add = add elt (old s).add_wins_add }
20
21 val remove_element (elt: ’a) (s: add_wins_set ’a) : unit
22 writes { s.add_wins_removes }
23 ensures { s.add_wins_removes = add elt (old s).add_wins_removes }
24
Figure A.4: Add-wins Set CRDT in Why3.
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